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TITIE:

THEORETICAL DIFFERENCm IN KISSINGER AND SCHIESINGER'S
MODELS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SlSTEM

La.dis K. D. Kristof, Chairman
~

Charles R. White

This thesis is a study of national security decision making
in the Ford Ad.ministration.

The subject for study is the Kissinger-

Schlesinger controversy in the Ford Administration. The thesis will
attempt to prove that the differences that emerged over issues of
national policy were due to deep theoretical disagreements as to the
nature of the international system, the utility of power in the nuclear
age and the means by which to preserve detente.
An examination of the substantive policy differences will be

preceded by an examination of the conceptual..disagreements between
the Secretaries on topics that are fundamental to any study of
international politics.

studies on decision making in 1ntemationa1

politics will be used to show that each man had a different perception
of the role that the United States should have in the international

system and the usefulness of America's strategic arsenal for the
preservation of peace.
A:f't:.er having defined the theoretical differences between
Kissinger and Schlesinger on issues :in international politics, an
analysis of the substantive policy disagreements between the two
Secretaries will show that they can be directly related to each man's
conception of the internati anal system.

Policy differences between the

two will be shown to have evo1ved out of disagreements over policy
goals, and not policy implementation.

Air:f' study of individual decision ma.king in defense and foreign
affairs stresses the importance of individual policy makers and of
issues.

Foreign nations perceive changes in foreign and defense policy

goals when new leadership emerges w.i. th which they are uncanfortable.
It will be shown, through an ana.l:ysis of the foreign reaction to the
Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy, that .foreign nations expressed
concern for the outcome o.f this policy split.

In particular, it will

be shown that the matter was of great interest to the Soviet Union.
In conclusion the thesis will reiterate the point that national

security decision making in the Ford Administration was unab1e to reach
a canpromise on issues of policy because of fwxiamental. differences
between the Secretaries of State and Defense on detente, the definition
of the national security in the nucl.ear age and the negotiating strategy
that America should follow with the Soviets on arms limitations.

These

differences on policy were made inevitable due to differing models that
each Secretary had on the nature of the international system.

The study

of their indindual perceptions will help to give one an understanding
~ to

..tty the policy disagreements ma.de compromise impossible.
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PART ONE

ORIGINS OF THE KISSINGER-SCHLESIIDER CONTROVERSY

KISSINGER

v

SCHLESINGER

Chapter I
AN ANALYSIS OF INDffiDUAL AND GROUP DECISION MA.KING THEORIES

The policy confrontation that emerged in the Ford Administration
between Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Secretary of Defense
James R. Schlesinger is the focus of this thesis.

I f an accurate

account of the reasons for the policy split is to be presented, the
study of the theories of foreign and defense policy decision making
will lllldoubtedl.Jr help in the developnent of a coherent description of
the theoretica1 differences between the two men on the nature of the
international system and the means by which policy decision makers
should define policy goals.
The nature of foreign policy decision making is such that the
policy maker must continually strive for internal consistency and
cohesiveness.

According to Karl Deutsch, policy is

~~

"••••an explicit set of preferences and plans drawn .up to
make the outcomes of series of future decisions more
nearly predictable and cansistent".l
Policy must have a consistency that will not hinder the ability of
the foreign policy bureaucracy to make the policy effective.
The political nature of foreign and defense policy decision
malting is the most important part of the policy making process.
Individuals with differing values, policy convictions and ccnceptions
of reality converge upon Washington to make the process inherently
a polltical one.

Canbined 1'i th the fact that each indivi.dual is most

probably a specialist in a particular field and represents a Department
1) Kar1 Deutsch, '!he Analysis of International Relations,
(Prentice RaJJ.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968) P• 77

2

with interests o:f'ten at odds with another Department, the process of

decision making becomes one of resolving differing points of view and
putting thEm into the proper persepctive. 2

This was certainly the

case with Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Schlesinger.
The subordination of secondary sets of policy objectives to
primary policy objectives is often the cause of internal can.ru.ct.
Internal. conflict must. be lessened through an attempt to reach an
accomodation an -primary policy objectives through a process of
11

consensus building". 3

Consensus building demands compromise.

If such compromise is not reached, the vezy structure of the decision
making system is threatened.

A refusal to compromise can set off

internal divisions that event~y must be resolved.
The inability to reconcile competing interests most probably
means that differences were so great that the procesS" of consensus
building was made impossible.

In the case of Secretary of State

1

Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger the import.ance
of such factors as conceptions of the nature of the interna.tiona1

system, the problem of apply.i.ng power at the right instance and in the
correct amount and the very developnent of a national. security
strategy in an age of detente can clarify why comprcmise and consensus
building was impossible.
An individual's belief system is important in the process of
2) Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense
and Foreign Affairs, (Harper and Row: New York, 1971) P• 15
3) ibid., P• 117

3
developing a conception of the international system.

Ole Holsti's

study of the belief 87Btem or John Foster Dulles concluded from a
content a.naJJr:sis of Dulles• public statements that Dulles had a rigid
perception of Sov.tet Communism.4 He labeled this percept.ion or
Dulles as "'t.he inherent; bad faith of the Communist model•·.
point of v.tew ma.de

any

Dulles 1

attempt at easing tensions between the

u.s.

and the Sov.tet Union quite unlikely.
The perception of the individual. decision maker is one t.bat
permeates much of the literature by political scientists in the study
of defense and foreign policy decision making.

The actors in the

decision making process often define the situation in entirely
different terminology.'

This is often due to the fact that the

psychology of the decision maker is influenced by his educationa1
and professional backgrollllde

This can inevitably lead to different

appraisals of 'What policy goals should be.
Policy goals are canpli cated by the fact that many inputs
confuse a decision maker's perception of what actually is at issue.6
A study of the background and writings or Kissinger and Schlesinger

on such topics as pOW"er, anns control and the need to maintain a
military balance will be helpful in giving us an appreciation of the

4)

Ole Holst.i, "The Belief System and National Images",
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, (1962) PP• 244-252

5)

Richard Snyder, H. w. Bruck and Burton Spain, "'!be Decision
Vaking Approach to the Study of International Politics",
International Politics and Foreign Policy, James Rosenau (ed.):
(The Free Presss New York, 1969) P• 202

6) Robert; H. Jervis, ''Hypothesis on Misperception", ibid.,

PP• 246-250

4
different perceptions of the two Secretaries on matters of national

secu.ri.ty policy.
Decision making by individuals in internaticnal politics can be
studied also from another perspective that can help us to prove that
the policy differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger were motivated
by two entirely different modes of thinking.

Sidney Verba' s study of

the developnent of rational and non-rational approaches to the study of
decision making is very helpful in this regard.

Verba develops a

rational model that stresses the decision maker• s cognizance of his
policy goals and his desire to pursue policies that accanplish that
purpose.

Power is assumed to be limited by poll ti cal factors.

The

non-rational model emphasizes such non-logical forces as fear and
the personality of the decision maker.
less idealistic.

The non-rational model is

Non-logical forces of which the decision maker is

unaware help to influence his reaction to events. The decision maker's
,.
emotional involvement with the issue at hand, according to Verba, can
increase ~the effect of ncn-logical and predispositional influences 11

J

The rational and non-rational approaches to the models of the
international system will be applied to this study of the decision
making and policy differences of Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger.
A canparison of the two styles will shovr that deep theoretical differences were evident and that these help to explain the substantive policy
differences between them.
7) Sidney Verba, 11Assmnptions of Rationality and Non-Ra.ti~nality
in Models of the International System", ibid., P. 221

After having reviewed the individual belief' systms and
perceptions or Kissinger and Schlesinger, the study of the substantive
policy differences between them will beccne much easier to understand,
and the reasons .for the need by President Ford to reso1ve these
differences will be apparent even to the harshest critics or the two
Secretaries.

Chapter II
KISSINGER AND SCHLFSINGER: @TIONAL AND NON-RATIONAL MODEIS

OF THE INI'ERNATIONAL SYS'l'Ell
This chapter will explore the uses of rational and non-rational

models in explaining the theoretical differences between Kissinger and
Schlesinger.

In doing so it will show that their models of decision

making originate from entirely different premises.
The non-rational model cf' the international system fits the
decision making model of Secretary Schlesinger.

It assumes that the

decision maker has little control over certain · aspects of the system.
<:ne good example for Secretary Schlesinger would be his approach to
anns control decision making.

Country A cannot cooipel Country B

to liml t the size of its strategic forces, but it can deter the other
side .1"r001 initiating an attaok through the use of a balance of terror
strategy that makes the probability of attack less likely.

-----

Fonner Secretary Schlesinger's model places faith in "deterrence•.
Deterrence denotes an ability to prevent an adversary from the use of
force through an equivalent or superior force.

Comparability of force

structures is inevitable under the deterrence approach.

Schlesinger

states that,
"••• our defense capabilities and plarming should be ma.de in
the light of the capabilities of our opponents ••• our planning
objectives should be such that no opponent has a unilateral
advantage over usn.l

1) "Fiscal Year 1976 and

J~-September

Transition Period Authorization for Military Procurement, Research ard Developnent and
Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel strengths",
Hearings Before the Ca:mnittee on Armed Services of the United
States S~ate, February 5, 1915, 94th Congress, First Session,
(U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.c., 1975) P• 14

7
Sch1esinger maintains that defense planning involves admitting

that decision making must o.t"t;en be made :Ill terms or what we must do

7

to deter a nation fnl!l acting in an aggressive manner, rather than

---

what we must do to persuade them to fo11ow a course that is rationall.y ,,,.
.

.

beneficia1 to them.

-

--

Because of his non-rational approach to decision

making, Schlesinger tends to build dichotomies about the intem{ltional
s;rstem that serve to reinforce his faith in deterrence, as when he states

that,
"•••we must recognize that we are dea.l.:ing in a world that is
militarily dominated by two states, ours and the Soviet Unionn.2
The military bipolarity of the United States and the Soviet Union
luads Schlesinger to the conclusion that the _United States must retain
a &t.eadfa:stness in our comnitments aroo.nd the world and be the major

c01mterba1ance to the Soviet UnionJ Detente is ma.de possible through
the maintenance of a strong military capability.h
The concentration on Soviet and .American strategic capabilities
gives Schlesinger a conception of the international system in llhich
the military-strategic balance dominates the political multipola.rity

2) "Fiscal year 1975 Authorization for Military Procurement,
Research and Developnent and Active Duty, Selected Reserve
and Civilian Personnel Strengths~, Hearings Before the Camnittee
on Armed Services of the United States Senate, February 5, 1914,
93rCi Congrese, second Session (u.s. Government Printing Offices
Washington_, D. c. , 1975) p. 7
.,\

7:•

-......-:-.',·~

; ".·\;i~::~;. ~ .. :·.:·.'···~.•--: . :::: ,

.~:·~ . : ~ :: ., ·...•

:;

3} FY 1976 Defense Hearings, op. cit., P• 8
4) "The Nani.nation of James R. Schl.esinger to be Secretary or
. De.f"ense" 1 Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services 0£
the United States Senate, JUDe _18, 1913, 93ra Congress, First
session,

(U.S.

1973) P• 43

Government; Printing Office: Washington,

D.c.,

-

8
of the systan.

Power is st.ill the dominant factor in the maintenance

ot international political stability according t.o the Sch1esinger
model.

The strategic bipolarity of the system t.hat Schlesinger

describes makes it inescapable that the United States is the "l.eader
of' t.he f'ree world" and must counter Soviet mili.tar;y presence wherever
it presents a tbreat.5

aoa:u, of attaining detente through mutually beneficial interactions are subordinated to the strategic balance.

The military-

strategic balance outweighs such factors as economic interdependence,
)

internal domestic stru.ctures and the influence of public opinion on
the nature of a nation's national security policy.

The justi:f'ieation }

for large military expenditures and increases in technological capacity
are generated frcm Schlesinger's -comparative approach to the strategicmilitary balance.
Because of the inequality of pmrer that exists in the international
system, Sch1esinger sees the spread of nuclear weapons as undesirable
because it wou1d upset the stability of the strategies of the supel'pcnrers.6

Because of the dangers of proliferation, nuclear weapons

should be distributed unequally so as to discourage the chances for
catastrophe.7

This forces Schlesinger into the position of defending

the improvements in the strategic capability of the United States, since
he objects to a Soviet d<llli.nance of the system.

This rein.forces his

5) FI 1976 Defense Hearings, op.cit., P• 29
6) James R. Schlesinger, nNuclear Spread: The Setting of the
Problem"·• Selected Papers on National Security: The RAND
Paper Series II 5284, September l974, P• l3
7) ibid., P• 14

9

bipolar conception of the nature e:f the international s;ystem.
Sclllesinger•s adherence to the non-rational approach to
decision making is evident in his ana.l.y-sis of the arms control
policies of nations.

It is based on the conviction that the monop]3
.-.

of nuclear weapons of the superpowers is a st.abilizing influence and
serves as a deterrent to the spread of nuclear weapans.8 Schl.esinger•s
belief that the rationalist approach to anns control is

l.i.111ited

is

evident in his eTcllua.tion that
•·•• • • the use of rational models presupposing quick perception,
development and absorption of new technologies and a high degree
of interaction based on astute JD()ves and countermoves leads to
a. misunderstanding of the arms control problem•·.~
Beca.11Se perceptions are limited and lmmrledge so often inccmplete,

Schlesinger denies that .rationality and flexibility are inherent in
the devel.opnent of ams control policy.

Political. decisions are

"beyond the reproach• of the rational model because political decision
making often neglects the technical aspects of the situation and makes

a decision in terms of llbat is politically expedient.10 Moreover,
policy makers tend to smother differences of opinion.11 The time
element makes it d1fficu1t and sometimes impossible for national
security decision makers to study problems in detail, and ort.en forces
8) James R. Schlesinger, "Arms Interaction and Arms Control",
Se1ected PtSers on the Nationa.1 Securit~r The RAND Paper
Series # r4, September 1974, PP• 31-3

9) ibid., P• 24

10) James R. Schlesinger, •en Relating Non-Technica1 Elements
to Systems Studies", Selected Papers on the National. Security:
The RAND Paper Series # 5284, September 1974, P• 76
11) ibid. I P•

84

10
~-

them to rel,y on past experiences and the advice of their subordinates.12
Rational decision making is impeded because of the limitations or human
reason and lmowledge.
Schlesinger argued in favor of the use of s;rstems analysis in order
to enable the decision maker to consider the long range consequences of
potential. decisions, and thereby l1mit the subjective preferences of the
decision maker.13

Politics- has to be kept to a minimum if' a decision is

to be effective.
. Such a philosophy' tends to make Schlesinger appear to be emcerned
with the perceptions that the other side, .in most eases the Soviet Union,
has or American power rather than the utility of American power itself.14

The bipolarity of the international systan, the need for the decision
maker to limit his subjective preferences and the necessity of counterbalancing the Soviet Union places the United States in the position of
having to respond to each Soviet increase in strategic and military
strength with-a coITesponding

u. s.

increase.

Schlesinger•s perception of the Soviet-American strategic balance
and his mncem w.tth the perception of nationa1 power illustrate~ that
'

non-rational factors daninate the Schlesinger model of the international.
system.

The strategic bipola.rity of the system dominates the polltica1

multipolarity of the system and makes the relationship between the United
States and the Soviet Union one that will determine the stability of the
12) ibid., P• 67 ·
l3) James R. Schlesinger, •'nte Uses and Abases of Analysis",

reprinted in the Sch1esinger ncmd.nation bearings, op. cit., P• 7

14) Peter J. Ognibene, •Hard Choices in the Defense Bwiget",
Canmonwea1• June 6, 1975, P• l.69

11

entire international political system.

Secretary of State Henr.r A. Kissinger's model or" the international.
__ J·lL sharply .fran that of Dr. Sch1esinger. It is
system differs qw.ns
rational, emphasizes the importance of politics. and can be described
as one that· embraces "Realpolitika.
Kissinger's most important contribution to the study of international politics is his descriptian of arevolut.icmarT' and a1egitimatett
political l!lystems.

These two concepts, combined with Kissinger's

emphasis on negotiation and diplomacy, the role of the gifted individual
leader in Kissinger•s ·writings and his belier that power has a new
definition in the nuclear age confinns the rational models for
Dr. Kissinger.

Kissinger concerns himself with the role that domestic

structures and the bureaucracy have in the ma.king of foreign policy
decisions and concludes that they often impede the developnent of a
truly creative foreign policy.
The concept of revolutionary and legitimate international systens7
is important in llllderstanding the Kissinger model because it serves
to detemine the nature of relations between states. 15

Revolutionary

systems, says Kissinger, are systems in llbich one or more nations
re:!'use to accept the system itself, and desire to replace it with a
new international system that corresponds to its own values.

Legitimate

systems are ones in which each system member is satisfied with the
system, favors a retention of the status quo 1 and works within the
systen to accampli sh change.

This is import.ant because Kissinger

lS) H8nr,. A. Kissinger, Nuclear W91ons and Foreign Policz,
(Harpe·r aid Bros. 1 New York, l9 7) P• 317

/

12'

believes that the Soviet Union and Canmunist China hB.ve increasingly'
shown tbenselves to be _interested in w0rld.ng within a legitimate inter- .

national framework and do not desire a re"fision of the status quo.
Since the object of any international system is to preserve the
peace, peace can only ·occur in a system where there is an acceptance
of the legitimacy of the system.
attampt to gain

11 abs~lute

states that feel threatened will

superiority" by tring to overthrow the stat118

quo.16 Because the tendency for revolutionary powers to seek absolute
security is destructive, a legitimizing principle is needed on which all /
nations of the systan can agree.

The legitimizing principle is peace.17

Peace is arrived at through the use of international agreements and
negotiations that adjust dif.f'erences through minimization of crises. 18
In this way the legitimacy of_the international system is strengthened.

Diplanacy can be used by men to gain constructive changes that will help
preserve the peace.

Of great importance in this process is the estab-

lishment of confidence and credibility by both sides.19 Kissinger believes
that peace serves as the legitimizing principle by which revolutionary
powers can come to accept the international system.

Once the legitimacy

of the systan bas been established, it can be perpetuated through the
use of diplcxnacy by statesmen who understand how the systm operates.20
16) Stephen R. Graubard, Kissin~ert

w. w.

Portrait of a Mind,
Norton &. Co.i Ne'fi Yor , 1973) P• 17

17) ibid. 1 P• 276
16) Amos Perlmutter, "Crisis Managements Kissinger's Middle Ea.st
Negotiations, October 1973-June 1974•, International Studies
Quarterly, September 1975, P• 346
19) ibid., P• 331
20) Thanas J. Noer, "Kissinger's Fhilosophy of History",
Vodern Age, Spring 1975~ P• 182

13

To Kissinger, the clash of competing interests is the cause of

confilct. 21 For connicts to cease, interests must be made as uniform
as possible.

The most opportune time for the integration of interests

is when a stalemate has been reached · and neither side can emerge w.i th a
distinct ad~tage over the other. 22 When such a stalemate has been
reached, it is necessary for statesmen to bui1d coalitions and seek
partnerships so that new goals for the system can be made. 23 Kissinger
is cognizant

or

his policy goals and tries to pursue policies that will

change the goal structure if there is a clash of interests.

This is the

so-called "mean-ends" approach for the rational model..
Kissinger's rational model or the international system is further
exemplified by his concept of the individual leader.

'lhe political

leader can take actions that will help to form a "structural rearrangement" or the international system. 24 The true test or diplomacy is
whether it adds to the stability of the system.
w:i. th individual leadership is .well worth noting.

Kissinger's preoccupation
The element/' of choice

is always present1 and the foreign policy clloices that will be made
depend on the political leadership of the nation. 25 . This reinforces his
belie! in the rational model for decision making in :the intemationaJ.
21) ibid., P• 186

22) John D. Mcntgomer;r, "The Education of Henry Kissinger",
Journal or International Affairs, Spring 1975, P• 61

23) ibid., P• 53
24) The N81r York Times, October 13, 1974, P• 34
25) Graubard,

op.cit.~

P• 317

system. The best example of .Kissinger's faith in individual leadership
is bis stud;r of the peace established at the Congress of Vienna by

Metternich and Castlereagh. The personalization of diplomaey is the
end resu1t

er

Kissinger's concept of indiT.ldual leadership.

The need for personalization is a

~spaose

to the need for

rational. procedures through 'Which crises can be managed.

Nations can

escape the f'ate of war and tragedy if they entrust their foreign and
security policies to gif"t;ed individuals who can exercise the tt.se of
power, wisely.

Kissinger's elltist approach was very evident in his

tenure as NSC adT.lsor to President Nixan.

Nixan and !issinger both

believed that by centralizing.decision making in the NSC on foreign
policy matters, they could prevent the state Department from impeding
the developnent of the Administration's foreign policy.26
' Personalistie approaches to foreign policy decision making were
favored by Kissinger because be believed that bureaucracies tend to be
mcreative.27

Bureaucracies are the -greatest hindrance to individaal

leadership and creative action because
"••• the bureaucracy absorbs the energies or top executives
in reconciling what is expected with what happens; the
analysis of where one is overwhelms the consideration of
where one s~ould be going... Decision naking can grow so
canplex that the process of producing a concensus may
overshadow the purpose of the effort•.28
26) Wilfred· L. Kohl, 11'l'he Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System
and u. S.-European Relationsz Patterns of Policy Making"•
World Politics, October 1975, P• 7
27) Graubard, op.cit., P• h9
28) Henry A. Kissinger, "Danestic Structures and Foreign Policy",
Daedalus, Spring 1966, p. 509

l.5
While Secretary Schlesinger saw power as san.ething that serves to
deter actors _in the _international. system from aggression, Henry Kissinger
bas come to believe that

power has becane U8eless in the nuclear age. The

overwhelming monopol7 of power possessed b7 the United states and the

Soviet Union often limits the ability of the superpowers· to respond to
crises because of the fear that the other side might intervene. 29

Power

is neutral, and the real paKer lies- with the men who control the instruments of destruction.JO

The possession of nuclear weapons b7 the Soviet

Union is not as important to the security of the United States as the

mm
or how

canposition of the Soviet Leadership and their responsiveness to our
initiatives for the negotiation of differences.

This· is an example

the rational approach-to decision making can be -extended -to Dr. Kissinger.
Kissinger sees the

internatio~l

system as one in l'lhich a strategic

bipolarity and a political multipol.arity eoexist.31

He differs .fran

Schlesinger in that he believes that with the advent of nuclear weapons,
the utility of our strategic and military arsenals is diminished.

He

states that
•. • • The most striking feature of the contemporary system... is the
radica1 transformation in -the nature of power. Throughout histor,y
power is more complex. Milltary pmrer does not equal political
ini'luence ••• With the overwhelming arsenals of the nuclear age,
however, the pursuit ~~ marginal advantage is both pointless and
potentiall7 sucidal".

29) Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, (McGraw Hill
& Co.t N8'J York, 196$) P• 18
30) Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, (Little, Brown
Co.t Boston, 1974, P• 47
31) Henr.r A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policz, (
& Co.: New York, 1974) P• 56

w. w.

&

Norton

32) Henry A. Kissinger, "Making Foreign PolicT', Center Magazine,

Januaey 1974, P• 38
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Kissinger's definition .of power and llbat it constitutes is much
broader than that of :or; Schlesinger.

Kissinger believes that non-

strategic factors must be included in the dete:rmination of national
security requirements.

This definition of national security and power

makes Kissinger quite skeptical.

al:~cmt

attempts by the superpowers to gain

a technological. advantage over the other.33 !:mprovements in the deve1opment or a national security strategy are oi'ten forfeited because of the
overwhelming desire to build new technologies.

Consequent'.cy' the creation

of defense strategies against wars of liberation• limited warfare, subversion end eeon<mic weakness are subordinated to improVBnents in nuclear
capabilities • .34 The maximum developnent of pmrer in the nuclear age
must· be a great cc:mcent for national security decision makers because• •••
with modern technology such a course must ~e the will".35 '
strategic doctrine transcends the maximum developnent of power
according to Kissinger.

This cmtrasts sharp1y 'With Secretary Sch1esinger•s

faith' in deterrence and his comparative approach to determining nationa1
security needs.

Kissinger's disbelief in the adequacy of nuclear detel"-o

rence to meet national security needs is based on his assumption that the
utility of nuclear weapons as an instrument of warfare is v:l.rlually zero.
Strategic doctrine should be flexible enough so that a pattern of response

to the non-nuclear challenges can be made. 36
3.3) Kissinger, Nuc1ear Weapons and Foreign Policy• op.cit •• P• 16
34) ibid., P• )1

35) ibid., P• 18
.36) ibid. , P• 18

Kissinger believes that securit.y and peace are interconnected,
and that the intemational SY"Btm should be l.ess geared to crisis arid
more geared to cooperation.37

Attempts t.o gain strategic advantage

over the Soviet Union can only 21erve to jeopardize the stability of
the newlJ" created legitimate illternationa.1 system.

For peace to becane

a reality both sides most benefit fran the situa.tion.38
of necessity, a change in the goal. structure.

This inTolves,

The political ramifica.-

tions of introducing conceptions of national security that are based on
military and strategic !actors alone can forestall the acceptance of the
international. system by national leaders with prev:iouslJf' revolntionary
inclinations.
Henr;r Kissinger's model of the international. system is clearly one

-

.

that is rational.

Kissinger's developnent of legitimate and revolution-

ary systems, his belief that povrer is limited. in the nuclear age and his

faith in the ability of' men to take actions that can enhance the stability

of the intematimal systen are evidences of this.

To Kissinger, a

definition of' the national security must be broad enough so that it. does
not view the .strategic-military balance as the most impor&ant determiant of' policy.

Ot.herwise the pursuit of technological advantages will

be the end result, and the possibility that the legitimacy of the system

will be questioned could _ruin the chances for peace in the future.
37) "NClliination of Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary of State",
Hearings Before the Conmittee on Foreign Relations of the
Uiiited States Senate, 93r:d Congress, First Session, par£ Che,
(u.s. GOvernment Printing Office: Washington, n.c., 1973) p. 100

38) 0 Detente 1974n ~

Hearings Before the Camni ttee on Foreign
Relations of the bnited States senate, 93r:d Congress, Second
Session, September 19, 1974 (U.S. GOvemmmt Printing Office:
Washington, D.C., 1974) P• 238

/
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Dr. Scb1eslliger•s model

o! the international system differs .:f'rom

that of Dr. Kissinger in that Schlesinger sees non-rational, t.echniCal
and apolit.ica.1 elements as important in the developnent or a nation's
foreign and defense policies.
balance dominates his thinking.

Schlesinger's concem with the strategic
Strategic bipolarity has been the

principal reason .for the success that t.he international. system has had
in preventing the outbreak of another world war.

Strategic bipolarity

must be viewed canpartiveJ.i, and advances by the Soviet Union in strategic capabilitiesmust be taken into consideration.

The United states

might have to respond to Soviet technological improvements, according

to the Schlesinger model, with improvements in its own technology.
Two di.ffer:ing models of the international system have been developed for both Kissinger and Schlesinger that depict a deep disagreement
between the two Secretaries on the nature of the international. system,
and such eoncepts as power, the national security, deterrence and peace.
Kissinger•s ccncern 'With creating a legitimate framework in his writings
causes him to question the traditional American approaches to deterrence
and the national security that have accompanied American decision making
since the end of the Second World War.

Detente is seen by Kissinger as

the outgrowth of the acceptance or the legitimacy of the international
system by formerly revolutionary powers.

Dr. Schlesinger sees detente

made possible through a strong American milltary and strategic capability.

Two opposing philosophies such as these give indications that substantive
policy differences between the two men on issues o.f

u. s.

nationa1

security were more than likely as long as they remained in positions o.f
responsibility in the Ford Administration.

J

Chapter III
KISSINGER AND SCHIESINGER: DETENTE AND THE SOVIET SISTEK
Detente with the Sovi.et Union was a major point

or

disagreement

between Kissinger and Schlesinger, so therefore an analysis of their
attitudes towards Soviet Comnnm:ism and the Soviet system would hel.p to
give one an understanding of why they disagreed on detente.

Individual

decision makers must develop belie! systems and establish attitudes
about the -world in which they live so that they can reduce the amounts
of info:nnation they receive fl-an the bureaucracy about foreign and.
defense affairs into a manageable form.

Because of the need to do this,

individual decision makers often reject information that does not fit
into their image, or model or the international system.l The purpose or
this chapter is to examine the belief systems of Kissinger and Schlesinger,
trace its developnent and conclude as to whether or. not it could cause
them to reject certain infonnation that would trbeaten their theoretical
conception of the ·international system.
· secretary Schlesinger's belief system was strongly related"to his
educational and professional background.

As

an econanist, his analysis

of the role of econanics in the international system and in the national
decision making process is helpful in understanding his attitudes toward
the Soviet system.
Schlesinger's comparative approach to systems studies and econcmic
analysis leads him to the conclusion that political forces dominate the
1) Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations,
(Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968) P• Sl

../
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decision making precess for eeonanics in the. Soviet Union.

In analyzing

the Soviet econanic system, and its capabilities for supporting a militarT
industrial cmp1ex, Schlesinger eonc1udes that the percentage of the
Soviet econooiy is a1ready highly militarized. 2 This bas put a great
strain on the Soviet economy1 because of the increas:ing demands of the
populace for consuner goods.
Schlesinger's analysis of the Soviet economy conc1udes that Soviet
military expansion has cane at the cost. of domestic econanic

go~.

The

fact that the Soviets have achieved large rates of industrial. growth is
not as important as the fact that the proportion of the Soviet econ<JDY'
that is need for initial resource allocations is quite low. What. remains
a.f't.er the initial resource allocations have been made ·cou1d be used for
Soviet defense purposes.3 Bnt. the soviets do not develop econc:mdc policies
on the same premises as Westeni ·nations, because political forces, not
market forces, dominate the . economic decision making that must. accan.pany
any determination of national security needs.4

The political decision makers of the Soviet Union need not concem
them.selves with the impact of an increase in the military sector of their
econany because the econmy is controlled .from the top down.

The laws

2) James R. Schlesinger, The Political. Econrz of National
Security, (Praeger: New York, 1960) P• 5
3) James R. Schlesinger, "CD Relating Non-Technical. Elements
to Systems .Studies", Selected Papers on National Securitz:
'!'he RAND Paper Series fl 5284, September 1974, P• 89

4) Sch1esinger, The Politica1 Econmy of Nationa1 Securitz1
op.cit., P• lb9
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or n.ppJ.7 and

demand do not app]Jr t.o the Soviets, so the arguments of

Western econami. sts that the Soviets .must eventually face the fact that
the militarin.t.ion of _the econany is detrimental do not app:cy-. _ 'lhe
interna.1 weakness of the Savi.et system does not convince Schlesinger
that the Soviets will forego furlher militarization.

If' anything•

Schlesinger is skeptical as to hmr an econany can devote

su~

large

shares of its Gross National Product to military purposes without its
~ventua1

utilization.

Sch1~singer

To be assured of

wou1d first

~ve

S~et

good intentions•

to see a transforamtion in econanic

decision making for national security purposes in the Soviet Union.
He believes that the Soviet leadership does not need to conf'orm· ~
West.em standards o:t increasing its attention to the demands of' consnmers.
Besides, totalitarian nations do not need to concern thanselves with the
problem of' resistance to militarisaticm 1 and have t _raditional.JJr had a
larger military component in their economies than t~e democracies.

: SchlesiDger•s fears were in part due to the fact that the United
States has fal1en behind the Soviet Union in both defense expenditures
and military manpower.S

The following tables, taken f'rcm Schlesinger's

annual Defense Report; for Fiscal Year 1976, show

wbY

he was concerned

with these developnents.
5) Fiscal Year 1976, .Annual Defense Report, Secretary of Defense
James R; Schiesinger

·~
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TABIE I
DEFENSE EXPEHDITUmS - FISCAL !EAR 1973
(excl.wies mi.lltar;r assistance and civil. defense)

llO

100

90

80

70

9

0

1

:&id of Fiscal. Year

23
TABLE II

VILITARY KANPCMERS

4. S

(millions)

4.o

3.0

2.s
2.0

I

64

65

66

67

68

69

10

71

End of Fiscal Year

72

73

74

75

Scbl.esinger•s tendency to use oonparative statistics in order to

prove his point closely' resembles the model that was developed for b.ila
that stressed the comparative approach to decision ll&ld.ng.

Sch1esinger

has reported that while the United States spends less than six percent

of its Gross National Product on defense related activities, the Soviet
Union spends f'i.f't.een .percent or its GNP on national. defense.6 In real.

terms the Soviets are increasing their military expenditures at the rate
of three percent per year, while the United States bas been shrinking
its expenditures at approximately' the same rate.7 The American situation
is .further complicated by the fact that over half' of our milltary expenditures -go into paying personnel --eosts;-a-s was the- case i.n· Fiscal -Year -

-

1975, when the defense budget totaled $ 92 billion and $ 50 billion went into milita.ey personnel caapensation.8

'.Ihe Soviets do not have the

problan. of giving attractive . sal.aries in order to encourage enlistments,
and can concentrate. on weapons research and developnent.
Along w:1.th the changing milltar,- bal.anoe; Schlesinger was skeptical
or Soviet intentions for ideological reasons.

In spite of detente, the

6) James R. Sch1esinger, •:A Testing Time for America",
Fortlllle, Febl"WU7 1976, P• 148
7) ibid., P• l.49

1975 Authorization for llilitary Procurement,
developnent and Active Duty, Selected l?eserve
Persmnel strengths", Hearin~ Before the
Armed Services of the thiited~tes ·Senate
February 5, 1975, 93i'd Congress, Second Session .(tJ.s. ~ern
ment Prlliti.ng Office: Washington, D.c., 1975) P• 26o

8) "Fl.seal Year
Research and
am Civilian
Committee on

Soviets• ideologica1 stance and doctrine of -the inevitable down.fal.1

or

capitalism bas not changed. In analyzing the nature or the Soviet threat
before the Senate Armed Services Canmittee in 197$ Schlesinger said that
we can e:xpect frc:m MoscCJW a· pursuit and increase
or the ideologiea1 struggle, and a belief on the pa.rt
or Soviet leaders that detente has aITived because of
a shift or historical forces in its .favor••• •9

11 • • •

Sch1esinger•s skepticism. about Sovi.et motivations for pursuing
detente can be understood when his econani c and ideological criticism
or the Soviet system are tkaen into account. These reservations•
caabined with his emphasis on the strategic bipolarity of the intemational system, make Scb1esinger belieTe that the role o.f the United
states should be to colD'lter Soviet influence throughout the world.
Schlesinger advocates a unifo:nnity in our defense commitments that does
not accoun"t for di.f.ferences in the politics of a sub-system.
mdformity leads to a scenario reminiscent or the

u.s.

Such

involvement in

Vietnam, as when he states that.
"••• we have vital interests in Westem Ea.rope, the Jlidd1e
F.a.st, the Persian Gul.f and Asia. Despite detente n need
a greater degree ot,steadfastness in our commitments
around the world".
9) "Fiscal Year 1976 and July"-September Transition Period
Authorization for llilitary Procurement, Research and
Developnent. and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and
Civilian Personnel Strengths", Hearllift Before the
Camnittee cm Armed Serrlces or the Uni ea: states
Senate, Febl"WU"T 5, 1975, 94th Congress, F:trSt Session,
(U.
Goverm.ent Printing 0.ffice: Washington• D. c.,
1975) P• 13

s.

10) FI 1976 Defense hearings, op.cit., P• 8
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Schlesinger believes that this is necessary because of the !act

that third

parties

are incapable

of ccnpeting with the United States

and the Soviet. Union in the military and strategic spheres.11 The
resul.t is the necessity for the United st.ates to take upon itsel.t
commitments !or which it might be unprepared or unrl.lling to undertake

because of dmestic poll ti cal mi.sgivings.
Secretary- Sc.hl.esinger•s belief system can be said to have been

gained .from his training as an econanist ard strategic analyst.

As an

economist concerned 1li th the process aC distributing goods and services

to people, Schlesinger sees the Soviet system as one that centralized
decision making on the hands of a political elite 'Who need not concern
thEDSelves with the danestic danands and inputs of its populace.

'ftle

.fact that the Soviet Union has increased military spending at the cost
of danestic goals hardens his auspicton or the tn motivations of the

Soviets.

His analysis of the Soviet syBtem and its ideology makes him

think in terms or comparisons and dichotanies.

The Schlesinger belier

systen, a1though smewhat modified, is an extension of the post World
War II attitude of the American national security making policy elite.

It accepts America•s role as the principal p01Jer in the world that will
contest

~

rea1 or perceived. Soviet advance in the world.

The contain-

11.ent doctrine is still found applicable in spite or detente.
11) James R. Schlesinger• "The Strategic Consequences ot
Nuclear Proliferation•1 Selected ~~ers on the National.
Security: The RAND Pa.per Serles II 5 84, September 1974 P• ll ·

The Schlesinger belief system is rigid and infierible towards the
Soviets because it insists that So'ri.et goaJ.s have not changed.. What has
changed, according t.o Scb1esinger, is the means by which the Soviets
pursue their goal.s.

There

"i.1S

no consideration that the Soviets desire

detente because of a need to establish what Kissinger would call a
legitimate internationa1 system because

Q:f

a genuine desire for peace.

Schlesinger could only be convinced of a genuine Soviet desire to persue
detente if Soviet society itself undenrent an internal transformation
that. made it. similar t.o the Westem democracies.
As

a political. scientist, Henry Kissinger reaches similar .

conclusions-as ·-ta- the inefficiencies in the Soviet system, but he
appr0aches the question o~ how this should -effect .Ame?-ica•s .policy

towards the Soviets .fran an entirely different perspective from that
of Dr. Schlesinger.

Kissinger's concern is that the transformation

of the :interna:tional. political systm does not necessitate an internal
transfo:nnation of the SoViet system itself. Extern3.l conditions can
facilitate cooperation in spite of the internal contradictions .of the
So'ri.et and American systems.
The ideology of' Cannmnism ' sbapes the sense of' reality. of sOviet

leaders in the thinking of Kissinger.12

Practical eoncems .enter

into any leader's actions, but Kissinger sees Communism as an ideology
which. dictates the perception of reality or Soviet Cammmrl.st leaders.

12) Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, (McGraw Hill
Co.:, New York, 1965) P• 196
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His skeptia:tsm about the SoTiet

C~st

SY"Stem is evident when he

states that
..... in the Soviet conception man is the product of a
social experience, a datum to be manipu1ated for his
om good11 .l3

The Soviet emphasis on the class struggle and their belief that
a socialist triumph over capitalism is inevitable a.re convictions

that are held by both Kissinger and Schlesinger.

But Kissinger's

belief system differs frm Schlesinger in that he regards the external
inf'luences of the intenaational political. system as of greater

mpol'-

tance to the pursuit _of'_detente by the Soviets than the fact that they
think this is the resul.t of historical forces.

Former]J revolutionar,y

pa1rers have begun to accept the legitimacy of the international political system, name:cy- the Soviet Union an:i Communist China.lh

Kissillger's traditicnal view of .America's role in the world and
his distrust o.f Commmism are -factors in bis adherence to Realpolitik. 15

A reallan and pragmatism are apparent in his belier system that cause
him to prefer a reduction in .American commi. tments around the world.16

13) Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policz,
(Harper and Bros. t New York, 19$7) P• 328

J.4) John D. Montgmery, "The Education of Henry Kissinger"•
Journal of International Affairs, Spring 19751 P• Sl

15) Laurence stern, •Two Henrys Descending", Foreign Policy,
Spring l97S, P• 176
16) J. L. s·. Girling, "·K issingerismi The Enduring Problems",
International Affairs, ~ 1975, P• .328

The policies of the thited States and other countries must content to
a

rapi~

changing politieaJ. scene.

The rapidity of change makes the

need for systm stability al.1 the more important.

At one time 'Kissinger believed that. the Soviet Union's main goal.
was to prevent st.ability. 17

The SoTiets w.:mid ue a treaty for their

own purposes1 w.l thout regard for the mora1 or legal importance of the

treaty.18 This is very important when one considers the Kissinger
negotiating

st~tegy

and the oirticisms that Secretar;y Schlesinger

made or Dr. Kissinger's negotiating strategy with the Soviet Union on
strategic

arms

lJJD.itations.

Kissinger does not see the possibility -or 8.n internal transformation o.f Soviet society as likely. - While the elimination o! priTate
property has •repeated all the evils of the nineteenth centur,y4''1 its
resu1t has bean to centralize decision making in the bands of a polit-

. ica1 ellte.l?

To-Kissinger,

the fact that power has .been centralized

in the Soviet system makes the chances of internal. change all the more

remote.

Because of this centralization, disagreements on policy are

not likely to be articulated with great T.l.gor1 since the rebellious are
subjected to confonnist pressures.
A politica1 evolution that changes the nature of a country's
system is cne that cannot be imposed .frcn the outside.

Idea.lists who

17) Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice (Harper and Bros.:

New York, 1960) P• 8

18) KarrlJ:i Kal.b and Bemard Kalb, Kissinger, (Little, Brown & Co.s
Boston, 1974) P• 60

19) Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice, op.cit., P• 295
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believe that the Soviet system.will change due to our own actions,
either positive or

ne~ative 1

do not understand how important the

-

structure of t.he international system is in the process of changing
the perceptions of revolutionary powers. 20

An acceptance of the

international system by revolutionary powers can occur without any

v/

transfonna.tion in the internal domestic structure of that state.
Kissinger does not believe that we should appl,y Western criterion
of analyzing econanic indicators and military capabilities in determining the motivation of the Soviet leadership for pursuing detente.
The external changes in the international system will make possible
gradual foreign policy. changes . due to the need for stability.
Kissinger has always seen ideology as . one of the factors that .

can delay the process of legitimization in inteniational politics. 21
Ideology is ha.rmfu.l because it leads to irrationality and instability•
Revolutionary states need an ideology to sustain-their hopes for achievement, but ideology -.often- blinds them as to the realities -of-the system -and forces them to regard status quo members of the system as antagonists.

Ideology fosters conflict because the dispute is not over the distribution
of benefits in the system but over the system itself.

Kissinger seeks

to create a world order that accepts compromise of differences as an
indispensable part of the legitimization process.
The need to bring the Soviet Union into acknowledging that its

20) ibid., P• 195
21) Thanas J. Noer1 11Henr,y Kissinger's Philosophy of History'1'1
Yodern Age, Spring 1975, P• 187
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best interests can be serv-ed through an acceptance of the l.egit:Unacy of
the international. system should be the goa.1 of American diplana.cy.
Cmpromise is llllderm:i.ned_if the United States follows a bargaiidng
technique that is infiexible.

The greatest

obstacle to .American

success in negotiating with the ScTI.et Union is the presenoe of
"moralistic formalism• that precludes the possibility that the United
states could adapt its policies to f'it the circumstances.22 The United
states wiJ.1 have to lessen its

demand~

and adopt negotiating positions

that tr;r to build stability into the relationship between the United
States and t.be Soviet Union.23

If the United States makes absolutely

no concessions from its present position, and even tries to extract
concessions out or the Sov.l.ets, we will have to risk an increase ill
eonf'rontations and military expenditures.24 This is undesirable because
it would revive the doctrines of liberation and massive retaliation of
the 19S0 1 s. 25
· The use of analyzing the belief systems of Kissinger and Schlesinger
in regards to Soviet Communism and detente shows that while both men have
a distrust of the Soviet· syStem; they dif'fer on whether the nature of the
.

..

Soviet system makes detente possible.

Schlesinger studies the Soviet

22) Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice, op.cit., P• 2o6
23) Henry- A. Kissinger, •The Moral Foundations of Foreign Poller',
Atlantic Community QuarterJ.y, Fall 1975, P• 21
24) "Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary or State 11 1
Hearin s Before the Comnittee on Foreign Rel.ations of the
ates Senate, 9 r Congress,
st Session,
One,
(U.S. Goverunent Printing Office: Washington, D.c., 1973)
PP• 116-117

2.5) "Detente 1974"·1 Hearings Before the Comnittee on Foreign Rel.a,..
tions of the Unit.ed States Senate, 93rd Congress, Second Session,
(u.s. Governnent Printing Officer Washington, n.c., 1974) P• 246

•
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system as an econanist and concludes that the politicization of the
econcmy means that all motivations have to be political ones.

He is

concerned that detente could be misrepresented as entente and that the
American people would cane to fee1 that the maintenance or a strong
military was no longer necessary.

Above all Schl.esinger is cancerned

that the price of' detente not be too high.
Kissinger discounts the need for internal. changes on the part of
the Soviet system as a prerequisite !'or a So'Vi.et acceptance of the
legitimacy of the internationa1 systED.
accept the status quo.

Soviet leadership has cane to

Nations with different nationalities, ideol-

ogies, religions and valnes can share a caumon desire for peace that
transcends the diTersity tha:t; canplicates the process.
Two belief systems such as these are perhaps inevitable due to

the professional .backgrounds of the two Secretaries and their areas of
expertise.

Yet the problflll of coordinating foreign and defense policy

and developing a nationa1 security strategy in the Ford Administration
was cc:nplicated by the differing theoretical mode1s and belie! systems

of the two men, in spite of these general]J"
were critical of the Soviet system.

anti~cxmmmist

opinions that

Kissinger• s global outlook, . and his

attempt to create a theory- of peace by which nations can live together
in harmony eou1d cause him to .overlook changes that could occur in the

strategic-military bal.ance.
approach to the

~i8

And likewise, Sch1esinger•s comparative

or American national security requirements

could make him minimize the imporlance of pollti cal factors and also
to reassure Soviet leadership of American peacef'ol. intentions. .As
detente contim.ied. throughout the Nixon era and into the reign of

33
President Ford, a debate within American national security policy

making circles was
by 'Which to

inevitable~- -with

p~serve

the question being over the means

detente in an age of strategic paritz.

-A
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Chapter IV
KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER:

POLITICAL MULTIPOIARITY V
STRATEGIC BI POLARITY

-

The analysis of the theoretical differences in Secretary o:r state
Henr;y Kissinger and Secretary of De.fense James Schlesinger's models of
the international system have shown that dif.ferences existed in regards
to .the nature o:f the system, the utility of power and the role that the
United States should play in world affairs and in its rel.a.tions with
the Soviet Union. What is evident is that a continuing debate over the
:Uuportance of America's national security policy was to a:nerge.

This is

perhaps best demonstrated in the policies advanced by the two Secretaries.
The purpose of this chapter is to review the most important policy contributions that Kissinger and Schlesinger made in the la.st Republican
Administration and show that the importance o:f strategic bipolarity in
1;he international systen was approached .from two entirely different
perspectives.

This is

particu1a.r~

true in the case of Dr. Schlesinger•

whose reign as Secretary o.f Defense was to disturb the Soviet Union.
Schlesinger: Retargeting Enhances Deterrence
As Secretary of Defense, Dr. Schlesinger developed a retargeting
policy for our nuclear weapons arsenal that demonstrates his belief
that deterrence helps to make detente possible, and that deterrence
is enhanced through a flexible and diversified nuclear attack force.
Schlesinger's comparative approach to the military and strategic
balance caused him to view increases in the Soviet strategic capability
with alarm.

In the light of the Soviets• increased capability•

Schlesinger observed that a more .fiexible and selective polic7was needed
in

u.s.

(MAD} 1

nuclear strategy than the polic7 of nnru.tual assured destruction"
that had been developed by former Defense Secretary- Robert

McNamara in the Kennedy and Johnson Admini.st.rations.
policy was to
targeting of

giTe

The Schlesinger

the ~esident a greater fle:xibili ty as to the·

u.s. missi1es on targets

in the Soviet Union.l

Instead

of targeting only" upon population centers, targeting options would also
include Soviet military targets. This is the so-called ncounterrorce"
.
·...
strategy.
' Based on the concept that .mutual. deterrence would

the cost of

starting

increa~e

if

an attack was the risk or sufferi.D.g immediate

attack on popul.a.tion centers, the mutual assured destructi0n poliC)"
was

seen by Schlesinger as incapable of preventing a possible nuclear

conflict f'ran degenerati.iig into anything other than a masSive -slaughter
of tb0 cities.

MAD had originated in an age of

u.s.

strategic ~peri

oi-ity1 but with the advent or miclear parity, a policy change wa~ deaned
necessary by the Nixon .Administration llJlder Schlesinger's direction.
The Soviets reacted strongly to the change in American targeting
strategy. The perception received was that the United States was now
preparing a .first strike ·· capa.billty against Soviet strategic targets. 2

1975 Authorization for Military Procurement,
'Research and DeveloJlllent and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and
Civilian Personnel strengths,, Hearings Before the Camiittee on
Anned Services of the United states Senate,, 93ro Congress, F:rrst
Session, February 5,, 1974
GOVerm.eiiE Printing Office:
Washington, n.c. I 197h} P• 7

1) Fiscal Year

(u.s.

2) G. W. 19.thjens,, ttFlexible Response Options", Orbia,, Fall. 197h1

P. 679
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'!'he Nixon Admlllistratien received much criticism. .for this retargeting
change .frcm the Congress.

Senators Thmas Jlcintyre (D-New Hampshire)

and Walter Mondale {n.!ti.nnesota) were espee~ vocal in the critici~
of the reta.rgeting cbange.3
in~oduced

Their fear was that the policy change

a des1oabilizing e1ement. into the nuclear anns race.

'l'he

Soviets cane to distrust Schlesinger because o:f it.

What counter.force bas done, said Schlesinger, is to enhance
deterrence by introducing a mechanisn that can C:ontrol a sequence o~ "'~
events
frail escalating into a nuclear holocaust., .by moving away fran
.
the -assured destruction ooncept.4 Schlesinger himself ruled out the

possibility that the United States would ever strike first, stating
that the

u.s.

does not possess the capability to eliminate a1J. of the

Soviets• missiles in a first strike.5 Its purpose is to strike at.
strategic Soviet targets if the Soviets should initiate a llldted first
a.trike, where not all of its strategic arsenal waald be used against

the United states.
The purpose of the polic;r change was to al.low nuclear cmflicts1
in the event they did occur, to be brought to a more rapid ccool.usion

with as litt.1e damage as possible.6 Schlesinger stated that the policy

3) The Congressional Qnart.er]Jr, August 9, 1975, P• 1746
4) Donald R. Westervedt1 •The Essence o! Armed FutilityW·,
Orbis, hll

.5) FI

1971', P• 705

197S Defense Hearings, op.cit.,

6) ibid., P• 38

P•

461
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change brought American· strategic poliey into line with that of the
Soviets.7
Further criticism of Schlesinger's counterforce strategy was
based on the fact that it would open the door for a full. scale escalation of anti-ballistic missile systems.

With nuclear war having

bec<1ne more manageable, it also might bec<1ne more thinkable.

But

Schlesinger discounted. these criticisms, again stating that the
principal aim of counterforce was to enhance deterrence.a The 'MAD
theory was to be discredited in Schlesinger's view• because it agreed
that the defense of civil.ian populations was not possible, wheri indeed,
a counterforce strategy that guaranteed the use of smaller weapons
would reduce the collateral damage to population centers near military
targets.9 Overkill could become obsolete as a criticism to limited
nuclear war with the implementation of counterforce strategies as
opposed to mutual assured destruction.
Deterrence would be enhanced under counterforce through the
creation of numerous strike options for the President because it
gives the President flexibility in a crisis.lo Crisis decision
making could be made more manageable, and a potential liJDited first
strike by the Soviets, or even the Chinese, could be deterred through
7) William R. Cleave and Roger
Orbis, Fall 1974, P• 674

w.

Barnett, "strategic Adaptability",

8) The Congressional Quarterly, August 9, 1975, P• 1746
9) Juan Cameron, 11 '.l'he Rethinking of
December 1973, P• 84

u.s.

Defense", Fortune,

10) "The Schlesinger Gamble", The Econanist, March 2, 1974, P• 18
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the use of .flexib1e strike options.
Secretar;y of State Henry Kissinger had written that the possibil:1t7
of a limited nuclear war, or even the llSe of nuclear weapons for tactical.
purposes should be planned fer. 11 Kissinger himself had come to believe
that the mut'Ual. assured destruction theories were no longer operable in
the era. ef strategic parity, and he doubted that the United States had
enough missiles to bring credibility to the llAD tbesis.12

The American

SAL'l' I ag:rement with the Soviet Union had covered numerica1 limitations,
such as the nlJlllber of intercontinenta1 ballistic missiles, subnarine
launched ballistic missiles and the number of anti-ballistic missles
allowed in the Ami treaty are good examples.

But qualitative increases

and the problem of the throwweight, or payload that the missi1es carried
were not.

The Soviets could technieally camply with the agreanents

reached at SALT I without having to worry about placing larger
missles in silos that were designed for smal.1er ones.

'.nle seriousness

with which the Soviets were to have negotiated the SALT I agreenent
was e'rl.dent by the fact

developnents.13

~hat

they accepted strict limitations on· radar

Nuclear parity was quantitative, but the possibility

that z qualitative am.s race coUl.d ensue was a rea1 possibility.
This was to be a disputed point between Kissinger and Scnleeinger that
helped to trigger disagreements over SALT I,

u.s.

strategy and the possibility of Soviet violations

arms negotiating

of

the SALT and ABM

agreements.
ll)Henr.r Brandon, '!'he Retreat of American Power, (Doub1eday:
Hew York, 1972:) P• 28
12)ibid. 1 P• 301

13 )ibid., P• 31.S

· ns~s

A

pn.ctit.ianer

or

MacropollUca

Eventuall;r, a conflict between Kissinger and Sch1esinger1 s
approaches to national secorit;y policy were bound to merge.

Kissinger

had al.1ra.ys thought of international political problans in term.e of great.

issues rather than the comparative strategic balance of poNer.lh His
macropolitical approach is dne to the fact that Kissinger felt that a
preoccupation wi. th militar;r and strategic bipolarity often causes
rigidity in the political actions of nations.

This rigidity shonld be

lessened through the acceptance of "World policy and institutions".15
In this manner security consciousness will al.80 be diminished.
American foreign policy, ·or necessity, must reconcile the ccneepts- ·-

or

st~tegic bipolarity and -political multipolarit.y.

The

this as the major issue confronting American policy makers

Secretary saw

in the next

era.16- Ironical:cy, -Kissinger spoke in this instance of what was the

·

1'mdamental point of dispute between himself' and Secretary Schlesinger.
The resolution of .America's securit:r requirements as opposed to the
pollt.1ca1 necessit:r for obta.i ni ng an arms agreement. with the Soviet

Union was the pr:bna.ry area of dispute between the two.

Should the

thited states accept arms agreanents that will enhance the stability of'
detente, even thcmgh the:r might put the

u.s.

in a strategic disadvantage

14) 'lhe Eeonani.st, October 19, 1974, P• 13
15) The Econanist, Jul:r 19, 1975, P• 48
16) .Alastair Buchan,
At'.fairs,

11

Jul.7 1971',

Irony of Kissinger 11 1 International
P•

373

. t.o the Soviets? Should the United states attempt to maintain

iu nuclear

capabilities, increase its s·trike options and continue to improve its
technological advantage over the Soviets at the risk of losing the

politica.1 relationship it has with the Soviet Union at the present.
moment.?

From another persepc'U.Te the Kiesingel'\-Scbl.esinger split can

~

a.nalyzed .from a poliey rlewpoint in terms of their perception of what
.Amari ca' s

role in the world shoul.d be at the present tme.

Nuclear

parity bad been found to be the fact by Secretar;r Kissinger when

President Nixon ordered him to make a strategic assessment of US-Soviet
strategic capabilities in December of

1968.17 This, canbined with the

trauma CJf tb.e Vietnam war and the dcnest.ic intern.al problems of the
United States made the Nixon-Kissinger team fo:mmlate a ·new foreign polieyfor the United states in the early years of the Nixon Administration.
Kissinger had come to doubt the faith of fonner Secretary of state Dean
Rusk that .American power was capable of achieving great goa1s, and he

feared that a continuation of such a poliey would produce a great strain

on American 1eadersbip and raise public expectations to levels that
coul.d not be maintained over long periods of time.18
Kiasinger and Nixon perceived a world in which America's power

to gain any objecti"Ye

was limited by its resources, the will of its

people and the strength o:f its poll tica1 leadership.

17)

Kissinger helped

and Bernard Kalb• Kissinger, (Little, Brown and
New Yol'k, 1974) pp. 106-107

Jlarvin

J.8) ibid., P•

65

Coet

to replace the old Cold War idealism with a "strong dose

of Realpolitik

and self' interest•.19
Schlesinger's emphasis on strategic bipolarity leads h:iln to the
opposite concl.usicm.

The stabilit1' of the . international system has been

threatened by the rentrenchment of American pGWer1 and Schlesinger
believed that an imbalance

eoul.d occur,, in the favor of the Soviet UnioB1

unless the United States is prepared to take the necessary unilateral.

measures to reverse this :iJ:nbal.ance.

Schlesinger !eared tbB.t •the spectre

of Soviet !iegemcuyl' presently exists in Europe and that recent increases
in Soviet naval strength in the Indian Ocean and the Far East had dramatieally changed the structure of the intemational systm from a military

standpoint.20

Schlesinger has recently writ.ten that,

usteadi]J' the entire world is becaning a single strategic
state ••• (it) can no longer be divided into wide]J'

separated theaters. tt2l

Schlesinger's appraisal of the weakness
at this time is based

C11

or

the American posit.ion

the conviction that it is the United states,

through its hesitancy and indecision, that is responsible for the
current tendency of nations to line up against the United states on
political issues.22

The desire of the United states to reduce its

19) Brandon,, op.cit., P• 42
20) James R. Schlesinger,

11

Atesting Time for America•·, Fortune,

February 1976, PP• 7$-76

21) James R. Schl.esinger• "The Continuing Challenge to America",,
The Reader's Digest, Ai:ril 1976, P• 63
22) FY 197) Defense Hearings, op.cit.,, P•
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commiiments is dangerou.s becaee of the fact that nat:ims will look
elsewhere for militar,y assistance and a11:1ance partnerships.
Fram a . policy ana]J'sis oi' the need i'or nuclear fiex:i.bili ty in
targeting and the need !or. reaahing political. agreements on nuclear arms

limitations, it can be seeri that the problem oi' resolv.ing the issue

or

strategic bipo1arity versus politica1 mu1tipolarit7 was one that woa.ld

eventua.ll;r separate the two men. Kissinger's insistence .that t.his issue
was the

mo~

cracial .:racing American i'oreign policy, was accurate.

'f'he

conception
of
two Secretaries developed policies that differed on. the
.
.
which of the two ideas woo.ld best be able to bring intenmtional
political stability to the- intemational -system.- ---This -caused them to
i'avor differing .policies a.S to .. wbat .America's defense ·commitments
should be and whether or ·not deterrence was -·reliable' in the nuclear

age.
Kissinger• s desire was· to create a -structure
'

I

politica1 arrangements. "This

n•••

'

or

peace through

is evident in his -remark that.

'

I

'

you shou:td be ab°le' to iise' crises to move the world.,
towards the structural solutions that are necessar,y. In
fact, very o.t'ten crises thanselves ~~ a sympton of the
need i'or etructural. rearrangements"• '-'

Kissinger was thinking .in terms o! making a system that is :tnly'
cooperatiTe and cognizant .oi' the i'act that interdepen.dance toJ;"Ces
naticns to work within worldwide institutions.

There exists within

the international system many areas of conflict, not just two.2k · The

23) The New York Times, October 13 1 1974, P• 35
24) Henry A. Kissinger, •Address to the Sixth Specia1 session
of the United Nations General

Organization, Smmler

Assemb~·,

1974, P• 57k

International.

prob1em Kissinger was trying to solve, in the words of Premier Ali Jhutto
of Pakistan, was one

or

"··· evolving the foreign poliey of a country striving
to build a new worl.d order 1 not. on the ashes of war 1
but in times of pea.cen.25
In the Xiasinger view1 polltica1 mu1tipolarit.y is potenti~
more dangerous than strategic bipolarity because of the fact that

political disagreaaents between sub-systans could lead to a polarization of the international system into the

u.s.

and Soviet camps.

Nations could ~e their resources as pelltieal weapons. 26 _The
Kissinger concern for

p~venting

the politically- mu1tipolar systm

'

fran breaJdng down into two camps contrasts sharply 111th Schlesinger• s
concern for establishing mechanisms that can prevent a non-cooperatiTe
world from destroying itself.
Foreign and _defense policy cou1d be expected to eventua:J.ly be at
odds.

strategic bipolarity and political m.ultipolarit;r, as concepts

with llhich American nationai se~ty decision makers most .deal, . were

can:plicated at this time . because the United States was following a
defense policy that encouraged increasing nuclear strike options and

improving

u. s.

iD. the process

technol.f)gica1 capac1.ty1 while Secretar;r Ki_s singer ~ s

or negotiating a .SALT

II agret111en~ that hopeful.ly'would

c0nclude with as much success as SALT I.

At the same time, the

25) "Kissinger: Positivel,y NegatiTen 1 Far Ea.st Econanic Review,
November 15, 1974, P• 574
·
26) Hen.17 A. Kissinger, "The Washingt.on Energy Confeerence:
The .American Challenge", The Atlantic Community Quarlerq,
Spring .1974, P• 25
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.American public was to believe that detente had

t~

arr::l.ved. 1 and t.hat

there was no need for the United St.ates to lllldertake the active defense
o.f nations, either through direct involvanent or military assistance.
The paradox of seeing the President of the United States sign a SA.LT I
agreement with the Soviet Uni.en and embracing detente 1 and at the same
time order the mining o.f Haiphong Harbor ::lm North Vietnam seemed inconsistent to the .American people, and a neo-isolatienist trend ensued.
How is detente to be maintained and what are its limitations were
to be issues that split the Ford Administration in its developnent
a nationa1 securit7 policy.

o.f

The proper definition of what is the

national security in an age or detente, and how it shoul.d be de.fined
in canparative or no:rma.tive tems were issues that eventua.ll,y had to

be resolved.

'.nlese issues were lefi unanswered, until the President

saw that his two Secretaries were working at cross purposes.

'nle

substantive issues on which Kissinger and Schlesinger disagreed llill
prove that the coordination of defense and foreign policy is made
dif.f'i.cul.t unl.ess decision makers make efforts to develop commcn
perceptions of what is at stake and what choices will enhance the
national security need of the United St.ates•.

Chapter V
KISSINGER AND SCHIESINGER:

ISRAEL AND THE OCTOBER WAR OF 1973

Any two national decision makers 1 when confronted with an issue

that demands the immediate attention of the President, bring into the
national security decision making process perceptions about the issue
that can influence the recommendations they make to the President.

The

ideological orientation of the decision maker, his belie.f system and
theoretical model of the international systan and his own personal values
often cause him to think in terms of the global implicatims o! a dispute
at the sub-syste:n level.
Such was the case in the developnent of the Nixon Administration's
policy towards resupplying Israel during the 1973 October War.

Secretarj'

of state Kissinger am Secretary o.f Defense Schlesinger were the primary
decision makers for the United States besides the President, during this
crisis.

The stuczy- of the Kissingel'-Schlesinger relationship during the

1973 October War is important because:
1) it was a crisis situation and could give one clues as to possible
relationships between the two Secretaries in future crises;
2) it gives us the chance to examine the nature of the KissingerSchlesinger relationship from the standpoint o.f which Secretary
had the most influence with the President, which will enable us
to understand why Schlesinger came to protest American national
security policies in the next two years;
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3) it. gives us the opportunity of examining the charge that Secretary
Schlesinger deli'b-erately violated orders in regards to the resupply-

ing or the Israelis, and the charge that Kissinger, in fact. was the
one who was really responsible for t.he resupply' dela;rs.

Any President mast have a high degree of confidence in his
cabinet members and advisors during a:rry crisis decision.

The

expertise of the meni>ers of the foreign and defense bureaucracies
o.f.'ten forces the President to rely on their knmr1edge in the making
of nationa1 policy.

According to Yorton· Halperin, a fonner aide to

Heney Kissinger when he was on the Naticnal. Security Council staff1
11

'.Polfer gravitates to those E-1~~d:~ who are willing to make
decisions and 11ve with the results"'• 1
Henry Kissinger had gained the confidence of President Nixon due

to the fact that by October o:f 1973 he had worked with Nixon for over
four ;years and had the President's confidence.

As NSC advisor to the

President, Kissinger held thirty-seven NSC meetings in 1969.

In his

first. year as Secretary of state, however, Kissinger held only f01Jl"
NSC meetings.2

Schlesinger b~came Secretary or Defense in the spring

of 1973. With Kissinger holding fewer NSC meetings with Schlesinger
as Secretary of Defense, it wol11d seem probable that Kissinger had a
very daninant position in the control of infonnation that President
Nixon received on national security matters.

This is very important

to l"Elllember when an evaluation of responsibility for the resupply
1) Mort.on H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policz,
(The Brookings Institutionz Washington, b.c., 197h) p. 220
2) The New York Times, December

24,

1973, P•

h

dela;rs is to be made.
Secretary of Defense Schl.esinger bad little influence with the

President at this time. With the reputation or being a bard-nosed and
no-nonsense indi'V'idual, Sch1esinger had little desire for making friends
through persuasion, was often at odds with many or his colleagues.
Schlesinger's problem was to gain access to the President in a wa:r in
which Kissinger could not control the means

or

commilnication with the

Chief Executive.
Schlesinger consequently caµld not be expected to have the same
fieccibility as did Kissinger in conceiving policies, because of the
cammnnication problan.

Although having served for four yeS.rs in' the

Nixon Administration in a variety or positions, f'ran Atomic Energy
Camnissioner to the Director

or

Central Intelligence, Sch1esinger did

not have a close working relationship with the President.3 In .the
'
1973 October war,
Schlesinger could not

be expected, f'ran an analysis

or his relationship lli. th Kissinger and Nixon, to have much input on the
substance or policy.
A further background in the study of the Kissingel'-Schlesinger
relationship in this instance should be prefaced by the examination of
hOll' the ccnmun:ications between the two Secretaries had been established
in 1973.

Upon becaning Secretary of State, Kissinger began a series or

contacts r lth Schlesinger in which they would try to see each other for
breakfast •at least once a week•1.4

3) •Schlesinger on Defense", Aviation Week and Space Technology•,
October 211 19741 P• 10

4) The New York Times, Decmber 24, 1913 1 P• h
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They also cmmwrl.cated by phone quite frequently.

This c(llllllUllicatian

continued for nearly two years until an open hostility between the two
Secretaries became apparent. to alJ..

These sessi.ans would appear to be

ones in which the Secretary o! State was to serve as a means by which
the President cou1d convey to Schlesinger arry- new policy decisions and
in which Kissinger a1me could control Schlesinger's inputs as

icisms that national security decision makers should consider.

to critThe

point is that Kissinger daninated the national security decision making
.Process by limiting Schlesinger's opportunities for criticism through
holding inf'requent NSC meetings and also daninating the access to the
President.
The outbreak of the 1973 October war caught both the Israelis and
the Americans by total surprise.

Secretary of state Kissinger stated

that both the American and the Israeli intelligence networks had reported
one week prior to the Arab attacks that there was no chance or war
breaking out in the near .f'uture.:5 On~e war did break out, Kissinger was
directed by President Nixon to organize the Washington Special Action
Group, WSAG, which was responsible for making foreign policy decisions
for the United States during the October war.
or Kissinger and Scblesinger1 tm.dersecretary

The WSAG group consisted

or state

Joseph Sisco,

Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, CIA Director William Colby and

5) Avi Shlaim, "The faillU'e

of National Intelligence Estilllates:
The Case of the Yam Kippar War", World Politics, April 1976,
P• 361
.

the Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs or Staff, Adniiral Thomas Moorer.6 '!'he
day a.ft.er the outbreak of the. war Secretary of Derense Sch1esinger and

Admiral Moorer met with top Israeli experts to begin a determination of
the ability or the Israelis to withstand the Arab attacks.7
Israel Wa.s in a strategically poor position.

The Syrians had

crossed "tihe Israeli def'ense lines on the Golan Heights and the Egyptians
had moved across the Suez Canal to its east bank.8

No one in the Adm.in-

istration .believed that a massive airlift. to Israel was necessary at this
time.

The

u.s.

held the conviction that in spite or the strategic

tion, Israel would easi'.cy win the war, and the

u.s.

sit~

woUl.d not _have to

risk .resupplying the Israelis ii' they needed spare parts and amnmni tion. 9

The policy or the Administration between the day or the outbreak or the
war and the day on which the Soviets rirst began to

supp~

the Syrians

and the Egyptians was to give the Arab block the impression that the
United states was trying to remain neutra1.

'!'his was . the so called _

"1ow pro!':Ue" policy of . the United States.~ ___

Against this background the accusations that Secretary of Defense
6) Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, (Little, Brown and Co.r
Boston, 1974) P• 461
7) The New York Ti.mes, October 7, 1913 1 P• l
8) Kalb and Kalb, op.cit, P•

h64

9) William B. Quandt, "Kissinger Clld the .Ara.Wsraeli Disengagement
Agreement", Journal of International Affairs, Spring 1975, p. 31 .
lD) Isslie H. ·Gelb, "Kissinger and Schlesinger Deny October Ri.rt. 11 1
The New York Times, June 23 1 1974, P• 10

Schlesinger impeded the delivery of ams shi}:Jllents to the Israelis shoul.d
be noted.

According to this account, the Secretary of Defense obstructed

t.he shipnent o:f' pbantan. jets to Israel and delAyed the chartering of

ci"Vilian pl.a.nes to Israel :f'or resupp:cy purposes.ll Schlesinger report-

edly refused to meet with Israeli contact to the United States during
this period, Simi.cha Dinitz,· on October 10th for the purpose of discuss-ing the matter of t .r ans:f'erring military aid t.o Israel.

Schlesinger was

said t.o have disagreed with Kissinger over the chartering of twenty
civilian planes to Israel for the purpose of !'lying emergency supplies
to them.12

Schlesinger was al.so said -to have told Dinits that the

United States could fly supplies only as far as the Azores Islands on ·
October llth1 .iafter-'haT.b:lg reoei"f'ed"'WOrd .£rta. Kissinger ' t.hat ·the United
states::-,ras was to use civilian charters for the resupp:cy effort.

After

this last bit of intransigence on the part of Schlesinger, President
· Nixon was to have ordered a meeting on Saturday October 13th in which

he personally ordered for the use of C.5-A military transport -planes for
the

resupp~

effort, and that they were to bypass the Azores and go

directly to Israei.l3

Both Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of -Defense Schlesinger denied this account. In doing so they both aclmowledge that
Schlesinger was not in the position of being able to impede the ·.
ll) Ka.Th and Kalb, op.cit., PP•

46&-468

12) Kalb and Kalb, op.cit., p. 472
13) Kalb and Kal.b, op.cit., PP• 476-477
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implementation of
Kissinger.

u.s.

policy at this time because of the daninance of

Sch1esinger stood by the story that he did not receiTe any

authorization from the White House to send military aircra.fi to Israel
until. the mom.ing o:f October 13th, and that whil.e he did try to get

American civilian charters to transfer the goods and supplies to Israel,.
American companies refused to cooperate.11'

The delays were a part of

national policy. While the United States agreed to

supp~

munitions to

the Israelis, the Militar;r Airlii't Camnand, (MAC) was not te be used.
The pri"nlte sector re.fused to cooperate with the Pentagon• because of
the :fact that charter companies feared the prospect o:f reprisals by
the Arabs.
Both Kissinger and Schlesinger were anxious to "break the Soviet
stranglehold", in parts o:f the Midd1e East.1 S American policy has
already been said to have been predicated on the hope that the United
states would not have to

resupp~

the Israelis in the October war.

It

was not until October loth that the Soviets began to resupply the

Syrians and the Egyptians.

.American policy during the period of

October 10th to October 12th can be said · to be that of attempting to
get ciTi.lian charter canpanies, through the Pentagon, to get the
supplies sent to Israel. The Americans still had the hope that they
would not have . to use military aircraft to send the supplies.

lh) J. L. Schecter• "Schlesinger and the Resupp~ Crisis"•
Time, July 1, 19741 P• 33
.
l!)) Leslie H. Gelb, aschlesinger for De:fense: Defense :for Detente•,

'.lbe New York T:i:mes Magazine, August

4, 1974,

P•
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The

u.s.

hope for a negotiated cease 1'ire is another factor in

the ref'uta.ticm of the story that Schlesinger is to blame for the

On October 12th the Israelis agreed to U.S. proposal
for a •stand in placeu cease fi.re. 16 The Soviets claimed that the

resupply delays.

Egyptians would also accept it., if neit!ler the United States or the
Soviet Union took the issue to the United Nations.
Egypt

But when Sadat of

rejected the proposal, it became clear to President Nixon that

the chances :for a negotiated .cease fire had vanished, and so the next
morning he ordered the military airlift to Israel.

Was Schlesinger the one who was stalling on the anne shipments
to Israel-,·-or was it Ni:xon--and Kissinger? -Nixon and Kissinger had the

better motivation far stalling on the resupply effort, and it was
Kissinger, not Schl.esinger who was in charge ef the WSAG group coordinating

u.s.

poll.CJ" at this time. - The .American 1eadership feared the

possibility o:f an Arab oil embargo, · and hoped to end the war with a
negotiated cease fire before there was a need to resupply Israel.- Kissinger himself should bear the majority o:f the responsibillty for
the decisions that were made, because of the fact that he did control
the WSAG group and for the fact that President Nixon

WB.8

preoccupied

with the resignation ef Vice-President Agnew and his own Watergate
difficulties. A more believable account would have Kissinger 1U1ing
Schlesinger to take the criticism !rem the Israelis wbi.le he was
ma.king a political. reassessment of the situation in hopes of aITiving
1.6) Quandt, op.cit. 1 P• 37

'4·
at an end to the conflict through negotiai;ion.17
.Ainerica's

resupp~

effort was pieomeal. and hal.fhearted at first

because this was national poliey.

Secretary of State Kissinger had a

very real concern that the October War could escalate into a con.f'rmtaticm between t.he United States and the Soviet Union.

Kissinger

himself rehsed a military airlii"t to Israel and organized a plan :ll1
which the United States would send supply pl.anes cmly as far as t.he
Azores, because he wanted Soviet-American cooperation during this

crisis.16 A review of the criticism from Congress towards t.he Administration at this time shows that it was the entire Adminstration that
was being subjected to Congressional. attacks.

Sena.tor Henry M. Jackson

(D-Wash.) accused the Administration of
• ••••
at

wit~o1ding

war,.

9

the means of

,

self~efense

from a friend

Secretary of State Kissinger's concern during the October War ot
1973 was to preserve the stability of detente.

'nle war between the

Israelis and the Arabs threatened to destroy the international. system
by forcing the United St.ates and the Soviet Union to back each side.

This was the first real test of detente.

.American policy was developed

at this time in a manner that meant to localize the conflict and preven1;
17) Leslie H. Gelb• "Kissinger and Schlesinger Den,- October Ri.rt.11 1
'l'be New York Tines, June 2.3 1 1974, P• 1D
18) Edward hlttwalc and Walter Le..quer, •Kissinger and the YClll
Kippur War•, Ccmunentarz, September 19741 PP• .36-38
19) Time, October 22 1 197.3, P• SJ.

the superpowers :firm reaching a showdown from which escalation of the
connict .woa.l.d most probab:cy result.
While Kissinger and Scb1esinger can be said to have been in agree•ent over the goal e:f preventing

u. s.

invo1vemen.t in the war,

~

disagreed over whether the Soviet Unien would actuallJr' intervene.
President Nixon ordered Kissinger to take charge o:r the

to the Soviet threat that they wou1d
war by

unilate~

placing a peace keeping force in the area.

u.s•. response

intervene in the
The Soviets had put

four of their airborne divisions on alert and bad aent five transport
ships to the Mediterranean.

President Nixon had opposed using a big

povrer peace keeping ferce in settling the conflict, bu.t Premier Breshnev
of the Soviet lhion asked Nixon to consider a joint
keeping force that would be sent to Egypt.

u.s.

u.s.-USSR peace

Bresbnev stated that i:f the

didn't accept. the plan, the Soviets might intervene unilateraJJ.y. 20
Nixon erdered the Secretary of Defense to alert a11

u.s.

stationed around the world upon hearing Bre8hneT's statement.

forces
SecretarT

Sch1esinger was responsible for the implementation ot the alert,

~

he disagreed with Nixon and Kissinger's appraisal. that Breshnev should
be taken aerious:cy-.

Schlesinger was quoted as saying that

•r

think the probability of So~lt forces being on rcute was
considered b;y' sane to be iawn.
Whether the aendillg of' the SaYiet t.ran15Port ships to the

Vediterranean and the placing of four SGViet airborne divisi0Jl8 en
20) Kalb and Kalb, op.cit., P• 489

21) KaJ.b and Kalb, op.cit., P• 1'97

alert

'RS' Bl!

indication of possible Soviet intervention or not• Hixon

and Kissinger were prepared ~or (-1ihe··.possibW.t,T-•' Kissinger's efforts

to preTent the big powers f'rca involving thEl!lBelves militarily- in the
October War is an indieatien that he believed that the future of detente
could well rest on the ability ef' the United states and the Soviet Union
to pacify the eituat.ion.

Schlesinger was

t.hi nld ng

in tems

or

capabil•

ities and strategies.

Tile two Secretaries al.so dilfered on their own personal. handling
of Western E uropean reaction to the American resupply effort.

"nie

Europeans opposed the use of NATO facilities for the resupply e!fort;. 22
Sch1esinger criticized West

Germany

for taking a •separate line11 from

that of the United States in the crisis, and specif':ical.JJ" referred
West Germany's call on the

u.s.

1;o

to stop loading American supplies and

weapons for Israel on to Israeli freighters at the

u.s.

forces port in

Bremerbaven. 23

Later, in the month of November, Sch1osinger

..
11~t

with West

German

Defense Minister Georg Leber and together they- W1>rked out an arrangement
that provided that in the !ttture United States llilitar.r equip1ent would
not be sent :f'rm West Germany on Israeli ships. 24 Schlesinger had ~en
able to reach a C<Bpramise w.l th the West German, and did so in a n:r
that might help the United States in ease of another conflict in the
Middle Ea.st.

Sch1esinger 1 s concern for NA.TO and the structure of the

22) Na.da.v Safram, •rnie War and the Fllture of the Arab-Israeli
~ct•, Foreign .lf'fairs, January 1974, P• 224

23)

'!'he Hew Yerk Times, October 27,

1973, P• 1

~) The New ·York Times, NoYember 101 1973, P• 13
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Alliance were important considerations in this matter.

The perception

of Western cooperation was deemed important.
This contrasts sharply with Secretary Kissinger's handling of
the Western European problem.

Kissinger's criticism of NATO was very

heated, and he is said to have been •disgusted" with the failure of NATO
to back the United stat.es in the crisis. 25 The Europeans apparently
had little desire to see their own econcxnies hurt due to a possible
West European-u.s. linkage during the resupply effort, a.f'ter which the

Arab nations would place an oil embargo on them as well as the Americans.
European hostility to Kissinger continued for the next two months, in
spite of the fact that the Americans and West Germans had reached an
agreement on resupplying Israel in November.

The Europeans were ex-

tremely resentf'ul. of Kissinger's criticisms as late as November 29th
of that year.26

Kissinger had less of a concern lli th the strength of

the NATO Alliance, and concerned himself with preventing a SovietAmerican con.frontation.
Secretary Kissinger's primary role during the 1973 October War was
that of "crisis manager". 27

As a crisis manager, he has

be~

shown

to

be concerned with three specific situati ons in which it was proved that

Kissinger was more concerned 1d th preserving the "structure of peace" and
preventing a Soviet-American confrontati~n in the area than he was with
reaching a rapid conclusion to the conflict by resupplying Israel when it

25) The New York TinEs, October 31, 1973, P• l
26) The New York Times, November 29 1 1973,

P• L3

27) Roger Morris, "Kissinger and the Brothers Kalb",
The Washington Uonthly, July/August 1974, P• 55
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needed weapons and arms.

Kissinger, and al.so former President Hixon,

saw the October War of 1973 as a potentiall;r destabilizing event f'or the
system.

The .future of detente, aeeording to the Kissinger logic, was

threatened by an overt show

er

.American support to Israel.

The resupply

dela;ys were meant to a1law the thited States to maintain a 1ow profil.e
during the conflict.
alert

or

The fear of Soviet interventietn led to a worl.dwide

all American forces.

The failure to consult with West Gennany

and other NA.TO coantries on the resupp)J' ef'f'ort and . the a1ert was

motinted from a fear that the:r. wou1d not support such a policy1 !2
the United states must go ahead without their consent.

Kissinger's

desire was to preserve the structure of peace, by using peace itself
as the legitimating principle that wou1d force nations to recognize
that it was in their best interest to preserve the st.atua quo. 26
Secretary Schlesinger's concern during the 1973 October War was

that of impl.ementing the Nixon-Kissinger policies and maintaining a
strong Western Alliance. The study of policy making at the individual
level during the 1973 war for both Kissinger and Schlesinger proved that

Schlesinger at this time was not in a position to chal.l.enge Administratian policy effectively,, because or the dcminace or the Secretary of'
State in the formulation of' American national security

p~liey.

Schlesinger's behavior during the resupply crisis contrasts with
Kissinger in that he doubted that the Soviets would intervene in the
conflict and in that he was

~ble

to re-establish positive contac:ts with

28) Graham Allison, "Cold Dmrn and the Mind of Henr;r Kissinger",
The Washington lfonthly, March 19741 P• 4S
·

our Western European al.lies

lll11Ch

easier than Kissinger.

Secretar;Y Schlesinger found that ii" he was to have a say in the

general. direction or .American _national seen:rit.;r policy, he wml.d ba"Ye
to becc:.me mcire wca1 in his cC111111.ents and i:e rhaps even risk a confrontation with Kissinger.

Because Schlesinger's base of support was still

quite sbal10lf1 he c0l11.d not risk a showdown with Kissinger.

Btlt. it is

clear that as Schlesinger• s prestige grew, and as he became to be seen

as a threat to Kissinger's influence, a potential showdown might occur.
A break with Kiasinger would have to come on a. policy that covered the
whole aeope or America's attempts to build a positive relationship
with the Soviet Union.

Detent.e, and the means by which to preserve it,

would be at the center or the controversy.

'lbe study

or the

Kissingel'-

Schlesinger relationship during the period of the October War or 1973
shows that Kissinger• s influence would sooner or l.&ter be challenged

and that detente weuld most

probab~

be the issue that separated \hem.

Chapter VI
KJ:SSINGER AND SCHIESINGER: SALT, DETENTI AND NEGOTIATIHG STRATEGY

The resignation or Richard Nixon frcn the Presidency placed f'omer
Congressman Gerald R. Ford in the White House.

President Ford continued

to have Secret.a.ry of state Kissinger be the National Security Cound.l.
advisor to the President.

Initial.]J' there was some doubt as to whether

the President was going to retain Dr. Schlesinger as Secretary or
Defense,, but by the end or 1974 the President bad decided that Schl.esinger was to remain as Defense Seoreta17.1

As the year 1975 progressed, a deterioration in the relationship
between the two Secretaries was evident• and deep philosophical. disagree-

. ments about

u.s.

controversy.

nationa1 security policy were at the heart

or

the

'l'he major substantive issue around which this disagreement

came to a head was that or American negotiating strategy with the Soviet
Union. In a broader sense, it .was the definition of' detente and the
means by which to preserve it that brought on the schim between the twe
Secretaries.

Both the Congress and the public came to wonder which

or

the two Secretaries was actual.ly enunciating the policy or the Admi.nia-

tration.
'nle fact that Secretary of' St.ate Kissinger dominated the means or
access to the ?resident on national. security affairs through being the
NSC

advisor helped to aggravate the crisis, but that in

the cause

or

the controversy.

its~lt

was not

Charges and countercha.rges ran through

1) The ?lew York Times, December 29, 197h, P• lJ
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the state Department and the Pentagon that tended to shaw the two
departments as antagonists.

Eventua1l7 the Pentagori ~leased a study

that questioned the whole concept of detente, which will be elaborated
on in the next chapter.
The problem of

anal~ing

the substantive differences on policy

between Kissinger and Schlesinger, and relating them to their awn
belief systems, is complicated by the fact that the Ford Administration
refused to acknowledge the existence of the split.

President Ford

initially said that the removal of Schlesinger was motivated by a desire
to

11

get his own team", but he later was forced to admit that serious

policy differences did enter into his decision to replace Dr. Schlesinger
with Donald Rumsfeld.

2

The substantive differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger
conform to the basic models that were developed for each Secretary in
the study of their belief systems and perceptions of issues.

'.lbe means

by which to maintain detente was the .fundamental issue in the KissingerSchlesinger cont roversy.

Schlesinger maintained that detente could only

be perserved through the continuing existence of a strong

u.s.

military

establishment that might have to increase its potential if it was to be
a credible deterrent.

In this way, argued Schlesinger, the Soviets would

not use detente to their own advantage.

Kissinger placed less faith in

deterrence, because he believed that political issues are best resolved
through political processes.

Kissinger was disinclined to accept

2) •Foi-d Finally Admi.ts Tension led to Shake Up", '.lbe New York
Times, November 16, 1975, IV, P• 2
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Schlesinger's arguments that the United states should increase its
strategic capabilities through technological and targeting .flexibilit7.
The major sub st.antive issues on which Kissinger and Schlesinger
disagreed .will be found to center on

u.s9 negotiating strategy at SALT.

The issues to· be discussed in this chapter will bez
1) The Cruise Missile,

2.) 'l'b.e Soviet Backfire Bomber,
3) MrRV•S 1

4) The Question of Possible Soviet Violations of the agreE111.ents.
other issues that also separated Kissinger and Schlesinger were
whether the United states should send Pershing Missiles to Israel, the
status of our position on troop reductions at the MBFR talks in Vienna,
and on the claim that Secret&r)" Kissinger withheld information !'rem the
Pentagon on the Sinai agreenent that was negotiated in September of

1975.

Background: The Need to Finalize a SALT II Accord
A very

~

concern of the Ford Administration was that. a SALT II

agreEment be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union
based on the fonnulation reached at Vladivostok in November of

1974.

Schlesinger's presence and vocal criticism of the tendency of the Soviets

. to increase the thromreight capacit7 of their missiles was a contributing
factor in the tension that came to the surface between the two Secretaries.
The Soviets were concerned that Sch1esinger's retargeting policies and
his ardent exhortations to keep America's strategic capabilities on a
par with the Soviets might mean that American policy was changing awa.y-

63
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~

-

fran the previous hannony -that had been experlenced with President Nixon.3
The Soviets also expressed fears that Scb1esinger had prepared fust
strike options that could be utilized in •selective strike• situations.
The Administration, however, desired to reach an agrement as soon as
possible.

Schlesinger warned that it would be better if the SALT Il

:f'lnal.ization

was

postponed until af'ter the Presidential election,

so

that a canprehensive agreement cou1d be reached rather than an artificia1
one that coul.d be reached Tery easily and be interpreted ambiguously.4
The presence

o:f

Schlesinger

obstacle to the completion

o:f

was

seen by

scme

observers

as

the major

an ams agreement with the Soviets at SALT

II.5 In specifics, Scb1esinger•s presence complicated possible negotia.tioos on the cruise missile, backfire bcmber and MI:RV•s.

The .American

lead in crnise :missiles was the prlJnar.T area of dispute. 6

The Cndse Missil.e
The Soviets desired a llmitatiOID. on the nmi>er of cruise missiles
that the United States could deploy on its manned banbers. Defense
Secretary Schlesinger was adamantly opposed to negotiating away the
cruise missile advantage, maintaining that it was a "bargaining chip"

3) •Schlesinger Hit for Noel.ear War Tallc", Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, Aug. 61 197S, P• 3

c. Wilson, "Schlesinge~ssinger Schism Deep•,
Washington Poet, November 31 197$, P• 12

4) George
'l'he

.5) Joseph Kraft, "'l'he Crumbling Administration" 1 The Washington
Post", November 4, 1975, P• lla 6) Dana Adams Schnidt, •F.lring Leaves Kissinger Without Cabinet

Challanger11 , 'nle Christian Science Yonitor, November

h, 197S,

P•

4
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for the United St.ates.7 Schlesinger argued that it was :impossible to
check the nURber or c:nrl.se missiles that both the

u.s.

and the Soviets

bad. Secretary Kissinger• s position was that the United states might
have to l:bdt its deployment of the crnise missile as a necess&r1' concession ill order to reach a comprehensive agreement. 8 Dr. Schlesillger's
opposition to :including the cruise missile in the 2400 level limit on
strategic delivery vehicles was another point or disagreement.
Sch1es:inger stated that it was not an ICBll because it stayed within
the atmosphere when in flight.
The Backfire Banber
The possession by the Soviet Union of the backfire bomber was
anather area •f disagreenent between

Ki~usinger

and Schlesillger.

Secreta.17 Kissinger wanted the Soviet backfire bomber to be excluded
fran the

2400

strategic delivery vehicle limitation that was agreed to,

but Dr. Schlesinger.believed that the backfire should be included in
the limitation.9 Sch1esillger was also crltica1

or its

exclusion from

the strategic delivery vehicle limit because or the fact that the
Soviets wanted a limitation put on

u.s.

cruise missile, and he felt

7) Clarence A. Robinson• •Cabinet Shifts Vay Speed SALT",
.lT.iation Week and Space Technology, November 10, 1975, P• 12
8) The Lc>ndon Economist, November 8, 1975, P• 16
9) The Congressional. Quarterl,y, November 8, 1975, P• 2349

that to give the Soviets the adnmtage in

~h

categories 110ul.d be lUildse.

A trade oft would have been the more desirable alternative.

Secretary'

nssinger -,.2:.felt that to limit the backfire, along with a refusal on

the part of the United states ta cansider putting a limit on the cruise
missile caul.d lead

w a possible breakdown of the negotiatlgns.

It is clear]J" evident that from the Soviet perception of what was
at stake1 a Scbl.esinger remcJYal woul.d .f'acilitate a SALT Il agreement.. ll
This perception was to continue throughout the Kissinger-Sch1esinger

dispute, and the Soviets would not soften their position.

One of t.be most intense points of disagreement between Secretar;y

Kissinger
counting

and

of

SeeretB.17 Schlesinger

the

was

that

of

the developnent and

MI RV (Multiple Independently-Targetable

Re-Entr;r

Vehicles) systems of the United states and the Soviet Union.

Once

again the disagreanent shows how Kissinger was vrary of how an7 new

recbnological developments coal.d upset the detente relationship and
the status of the negotiations, while Schlesinger was concerned with
hmr techno1ogical developnents could upset the strategic balance
between the nperpowers.
The Soviets, according to reports by Secretar.r Schlesinger, had
begun a missile testing program in the suraer of 1973 that danonstrated

10) Tad Szulc, nThe Firings and Foreign PoliC,- 1 The New Republic,
November JS. 1975, P• 8
·
11) Gu;J" Halverson, 11Schl.esinger Ouster Boosts SALT Prospects",
The Christian Science Monitor, November S, l97S, P• ll

10
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that theT did possess a MIRV capabiliv.

l2

Sch1esinger belieTed that

. this new devel.opRent radicall.7 cbaliged iihe overall balance that had been

negQtiated at SALT t.13 Secretary Kissinger cl.id not• arguing that the
United states already possessed a "nuc1ear su:tficienc;;y" that woul.d more
than o!f'set any new MIRV technology that was developed by the Soviets.

The disagreement centered on the number of' warheads that the United
States should have that wou1d be an.ed 1ll. th KIRV•s.

SecretarJ' Scblasinger

believed that the United states should have at least a wo to one advantage in ICBM•s that were am.eel with JIIRV's beea115e of' the fact that the

Soviets possessed a decided advantage in the 'throwweigh'- advantage

or

its miasiles.14 Secretary Xissinger deilied that this was a · major issue,
and repeated his warnings tha.t such demands wonld only serve to undennine

detente and threaten the stability of the international. s.rstm.
Schlesinger at one ti.me was also opposed to an increase in the numerica1
limitation on Soviet MIRV•s aboTe the level ef 1320.1 5 The method of

co1D1ting MrRV•s was also at issue• with Kissinger favoring possible
revisions and Schlesinger opposed to lll1Y change in the counting qstem.16

12) U.S. Hews and Wor1d Report.• Kay
13) "Ford's Costly Pttrge"• ~'

1:J1

1974. P• .38

.NoTanber 17~

1975, P• 20

lb.} Joseph 'Framm1 "Ki-asi.nger-Schlesinger Feud11 1 U.s~ Hews

and World Report.,

~

22 1 19741 P• 22

15)Peter Goldman and 'nlc:aas DeFrank, "Ford's Big Shu.ff1e•
Newsweek, Hovmber 17, 1975
16) The Landon Economist, Novamver 8• 1975, P• 16
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Possible Soviet Violations
Part ef the reason wh;r Secretary Schlesinger was at odds with
Secretary Kissinger was because of the ambiguit;r 0£ the SALT I text

and the fact that it all.awed the SGT.i.ets ·a considerable degree ot
latitUde in the interpretation of the agreeirumt.17

Froa a technical

standpoint, t.he Soviets had not violated certain provisions o:f the
agreement, but t.he lR>rding was so loose as t.o allar for T.i.ola:tictns

or

the spirit of the agreement, wbcih Schlesinger apparentl:y had decided
were quite numerous.
One o:f the violations of the SALT I agreement that bothered
Schlesinger was that or the ~~struction of il.liga1 ICBM silos and

to 200 •command and control centers" that _had been discovered .:f'r<a
the photos given by'·u.s. intelligence satellites.18 Schlesinger was

up

critical of Kissinger in this regard because Kissinger would not
present these violations to the Sorl.ets.

One of the violations

or

the SALT I agreement that was of

particular brportance in the Kissinger-Schlesinger feud was that

or

the Soviet testing of radar equipnent.

The Soviets bad began to place
19 .
its SA-.5 radar on a range on Kamchatka.
The Soviets reportedly had
17) •Schlesinger Hits Violations of SALT, Posture Trend111, Aviation
Week and Space Tecbnol!Q', December 1, 1975, P• 21
18) Drew' Middleton, "Schlesinger's Views of Kissinger Described",
The New York Times, Ncwemver 8, 197.5, P• 2
19) Clarence A. Robinson, •Kissinger Deliberately Concealing SALT
Viola~ions, Zumwal.~ Claims", A'rl.ation Week and Space Technology:,
December 8, 197.5, P• 14
.

placed testing devices in the modes or their

.AB)(

missi1es.

The testing

began in April of 1975 and was to have been used to track incoming

missiles. 20

Secretary or Stat.a Kissinger later said that it was decided

not to bring the radar issue to the attention of the Soviets because
the United states did not want to revea1 the source of its intelligence.
He did not deny that the Soviets used the radar.

21

A.rt.er his dismissal,

Secretary Schlesinger appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and stated that the Soviet radar testing was a direct 'ri.olation
of the SALT I agreement. 2 ~
Secretary or Defense Schlesinger• s criticism of the SALT I agrement

that W'U"negotiated is .:furt;her demonstrated

by the fact that the agreement

did not limlt the size of missiles that the Soviets could deploy, but only
the size of th.e mis~le . silos themselves. 23

'Ibis was made clear in his

criticism of the Soviet deployment of the SS-19 missile, which was f'i.f'ty
percent larger than the anticipated size of' Soviet missiles at the time
of the signing of the agreement.

Since the SS:-19 can fit into the silos

of SS-ll missiles, it is technically not a violation of the agreement.
Schlesinger remarked that ambiguous agreements that do not account .for

20) "Kissinger Answers His Critics•·,
DeeElllber 22 1 1975, P• 2S
21) ibid., P•

u.s.

Hews and World Report,

25

.22) Cecil Brownlow, "Soviet Weapons Work Seen as SA.LT Violation•,
Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 8, 1975 1 P• 16
·. :;2J) Clarence A. Robinson, •Cabinet Shi.f'ts Mq Speed SALT",
Arlation Week and Space Technology, Noveni>er 10 1 1975, P• 12·

cirC1.DStanoes suob. as these were part of a Kissinger strategy o! negotiating 11Pre aaptive concessions• to the Soviets. 24
Despit.e the Sch1esinger criticism o! the SALT I agreement, the
Defense Secretary still believed that a SALT II agreement should be
reached.

Bn

Sch1esinger•s criticism of the Kissinger negotiating

st7le does shaw that each Secretary bad a fundamenta.l..ly different perception as to what is negotiable and what is not.

The examination of

Schlesinger's critici!Dls o! Kissinger on SALT negotiating strategy prove
that be believed that militar;y advances made by the Soviet Union must be
~ed.

comparativel.y rather than on their own merits.

On1Y one that

prevents the Soviet Union from gaining advantages .tran a loose interpretation of the agreement can be acceptable to
decision makers.
ment of a

SALT

u.s.

national security'

Secretary Kissinger believed that the strict enforce-

agreement and a demand for concessions on the pa.rt of the
'

Soviets on t.he backfire bomber coW.d make the Soviets decide .to leave the
negotiating table and resu:ne an unending anis race.

These positions are

di.rec~ rel.ated to each man' 8 belie! system and his perception of what

is at stake in st.rat.egic ams limitation negotiations. ·
Kissinger's Control of Information

Kissinger's dominant role as both Secretary of State and National.
Security Council advisor to the President

was of

increasing importance

as the policy disagreements betnn Kissinger and sCbl.e singer became
apparent to all by 197S. Secretary Schlesinger• s most revealing comment
24) Drew Middleton, •Schlesinger's Views of Kissinge:r Described•,
The New York Times, November 8, 197S, P• 2
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as to Kissinger's dem.inance was that the Secretary

or st.ate

wOlll.d often

·•'throttle debate•• and fail to bring to the President policy.. recommendations and opposing points

or view

fram Scb1esinger and other N.SC

members.2.S Kissinger and Schlesinger were said to have engaged in
heated debates over ams negotiating strategy at DlBJlY of these NSC
meetings. 26
Secretary Schlesinger waa a1so disturbed by the illct that Secretary
Kissinger did not .inform the Penta.gen as to the September 197S negotiations on the Sinai agreement. 27 Whether or not. Secretary Kissinger had
come to make a habit of not infoming other government o!f'icia1s as to
the status of nego:tiations and agreements has been a topic

or

consider-

able debate in this country, especi.all:r the charge that he kept President
Ford in the dark as to possible Soviet violations of the SALT I and ABK
agrea:nents. 28 In any event, the tendency of Kissinger to centralize the
channels of communication to the President· forced Secretar,r Sch1esinger
to becane mre vocal in his · criticisms of American negotiating strategy.

Conflict over the Pershing )fissile
Secretary of' State Kissinger and Secreta.ey of De.fense Schlesinger
also disagreed on whether the United states sbou.l.d pro-vi.de Israel Yi.th
2.S) "Ford's Costly Purge", Time~ November 17, 1975, P• 12
26) "Dete:nte: H.K.!

J.s.•,

Time, November 17 1 1975, P• 20

27) Bernard Ouertzman, "Behind Shirt.s Pllsh for Arms Pact",
The New York Times, November 4, 1975, P• 1
28) R. Hotz, "The Case Against Kiesingeru, Aviation Week and
Space Technology, Decanber 8 1 1975, P•

7l.
Pe~hing Jfissiles.29

Kissinger wanted to giTe the Israelis the means

by which they could dei"end themse1ves ill the event of another Arab
attack and maintain the semblance of a balance of power in the Middle
Fast.

Secretary Schlesinger, while aclmowledging the importance o! a

military equilibrilDll in the Middle F.ast• saw the providing of Pershing
missiles to Israe1 as sanething that cou1d dep1ete the

u.s.

stockpile

of that. missile• since the United States had stopped its production.JO
Schlesinger

was

concemed about the effect that this woul.d have on

u.s.

defense capabilities. just as Kissinger was concemed with the impact
that a revelation o:C our lmowledge or Soviet radar vi.olations would have
on our ability to get intelligence about such violations in the future.
In each case the Seeretariea~disagreed, bu.t the motivation for the

disagreement

was

the same. · _
The Forward Based Systems-FBS

Another issue that separated Secretary Kissinger and Secretar,r
Schlesinger was that of the place of the Forward Based Systems in
rmclear anns l1mi ta.tions.

The Forward Based Systems are nuclear-eqfdpped

aircra.f't and missiles that are based in Europe.
wanted

to keep the

FBS

out of the

SALT

Secretary Kissinger·

negotiations and put them in the

Mutual Balance and Force 'Reductions talks at Vienna.

Secreta.r;y Schlesinger

29) Dana Adams Schmid~, "Firing Leaves Kissinger Without Cabinet
Chall.enger 0 • The Christian Science Monitor. November 4. 1975,
P•

4

·

30) Clarence A. Robinson, "Cabinet Shi:f'ts May Speed SALT 11 1

Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 10, 1975, P• l.2
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disagreed,, saying that the Fm should be pnt in the SAI!l' document.31
Here again is an example of a polici disagreement that helped to set
the two Secretaries at odds with one another.
The Inevitable Policy Conf'rontation

From a study of the disagreements between Secretary of state Henry
Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Scb1esinger it is clear:Q"
evident that both men disagreed on what the arms negotiating policy of
the United states should be.

These disagreements were generated out

of differences aliJ to their perception of the Soviet threat and their
de.t"inition of what constitutes a threat to the national security of the
United States.

Schlesinger inSisted that the United States maintain a

position of superiority in the negotiating sessions,

~d

was inclined

to favor a relat.ive:cy hard line stance towards the Soviets.3 2 Not only
did Schlesinger believe that the United States should not make any

concession to the Soviets, but he also took the position that it should
be the Soviets who should be making the concessions.33 Kissinger's fear
was that a prolonged use of a strategy such as Schlesinger was advancing

could lead the Soviets to believe that it was the United states that was

trYing

to use detente to gain a strategic advantage, and thereby lead to

31) The Econamist, November 81 197.S, P• ··l.6

32)

Furlher Fallout From the Shake Up•1, Time, Novanber 24,, 197.5,
p. 29 -11

33) John Finney, "Uncertain Pentagon Asks 'What Rumsfeld's Policy
Ia", The New York Times, November 5, 197.5, P• 24
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a deterioration in the negotiation~~Jh Kissinger's emphasis on actions
of decision makers are important in this regard.

The actions of the

leaders of the United states should be cooperative and conciliatory,
and attempts to gain an advantage over the Soviets in arms limitations
negotiations could lead to a breakd01m in the detente relationship.
'Ille desire of Kissinger and President Fort to obtain a SAI:r II
agreement in an election ;rear faded aft.er the removal. of Dr. Seh1esinger

from the Pentagon. The Soviets saw Schlesinger as an obstacle to a new
SALT accord. 35 While President Ford stated that he ~s under no timetable
to reach an agreement with the Soviets, :in January of 1976 he sent Dr.
Kissinger to Moscow to confer with Breshnev and Kosygin on SAI.:l' II, and
the White House reported that the President had reached an agreement
within the Administration on a can.promise prowsal. for SALT II.36 Such
a proposal. might have been resisted by Schlesinger.

The Soviets, ever

wary of the impact the Presidential campaign on American negotiating
strategy, began to stall on the

u.s.

pl"Oposals because of the internal

debate over detente in the United States. With Secretary of State
...

...

Kissinger coming under vicious attack from the

anti~etente

forces in the

tmited states, President Ford was forced to reconsider the effects that
a SALT II agreement might have on the .Administration and its conduct of
foreign and defense policy, and decided not to pursue SALT II any further
..

34) "Pentagon: .A. Strong Voice is S'J;illeda,
"Report, November 17, 1975, P• 17

u.s.

News

35) Peter Osnos, "Kremlin Saw Defense Chief as Foe•,
The Washington Post, NovElllber 4, 1975, P• 1
36) The New York Times, February 17 1 1976, P• 18

and World
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this year.37 The firing of Schlesinger opened up a new r01.U1d of criticism
of Secretar;r Kissinger and President Ford, and instigated a debate in this
country over Kissinger's negotiating strategies and the benefits of detente.
The result was the postpomment of the SALT II agreement.
The need for a President to surround himself with individuals of
opposing points of view is necessary in any administration. But once a
policy has been decided upon, there is a need to unite behind it if it is

to be successful.

A failure to accanplish a push towards accomodation

on a policy decision, according to fonner Johnson Administration aide Roger
Hilsman, can lead to a breakdollll in the system of policy making itself:

"••• there is in a1l participants an intuitive realization
that prolonged intransigence, stalemate and indecision m
urgent and fundamental issues might becane so intolerable
as to threaten j~e very fonn and structure of the system
of govemancen.
It is the responsibility of the President to maintain an organiza,..
tion that can inform him as to the problems that are present in the
making or American national security policy.

The President should

encourage an adversary relationship between his Cabinent members and
advisors in the fonnul.ation of policy, but it is imperative that
unanimity be present if its execution is to be effective.

If conflicts

cannot be resolved, participants in the decision making process eventually may try to alter or change the rules by whicll decisions have been

37) The New York Times, April ll, 1976, P• 1

38) Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and
Foreign Affairs, (Harper and Row: New York, 1971) P• 117
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made.39 If this becomes evident to the President, he 11'.i.ll be put into
the position or chooaing betw~ rival policies.

If the Secretary ot

state is involTed, one wcml.d eJCPeot that the President would adhere to
the advice of the Secretary of state, because the relationship between
the President and his .foreign secretary is the most important one in the
malting of .American foreign poll·cy. 40
Secretary

Kissinger~s dominance

in the nationa1 security decision

mald ng process made it difficult for Secretary Sch1esinger to get his
alternatives to the President in a fonn that waul.d present cogent
rebuttalB to the Kissinger proposals.
cl.aim.

At least that

was the Sch1esinger

This coni>ined llli. th the serious policy differences
on. detente,
.

SALT negotiating strategy and the issue o! Soviet violations of past
ag~eements

led Schlesinger to publicly disagree with

policies.

Schlesinger decided to risk the wrath of the President, and

continued his criticisms,

~ong

inany

Administration

with open comments on the irresponsibil-

ity of the Congress. _Schlesinger had been known to want to use his.
office to •stimulate a great debate about American defense policies". hl.
This is perhaps the motiw.tion for his candor.

Soon the disagreements

•voo.ld beocne so intense that the President would have to choose which
man would stay and which would go.

39) Yorton H. Halperin, Bttreaucratic Politics and Foreign Policz,
('!be Brooldngs Institution: Washington, n.c., l974) P• iOii

40) ibid., p. -111

41) Leslie H. Gelb, "Schlesinger .for Defenses De.fense £or Detentea,
The New York Times Magazine, August h, 1975, P• 35

Chapter VII

KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER: THE DIA REPORT AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET
'nle division within the Ford Administration on national security
affairs was exacerbated by the release of a report by the Defense

Intelligence Agency that questioned Soviet motivations for pursuing
detente.

The report, released just a few days before the .firing o.f

Secretary of Defense Schl.esinger, had angered Secretary o.f State
Kissinger to such an extent that he blamed Schl.esinger for its release.
A.f'ter this incident the decision making point became inevitable for
President Ford.

The President would have to decide whether it was

possible to coordinate foreign and defense policy under circumstances
such as these.
Secretary of state Kissinger was angered by ·the fact that the DIA
document had been allowed to c:lrcul.a.te throughout the Department o!
Defense, and eventua.11.y reach the hands of an outside, private organization, the .American Security C.o uncil.l The American Security Council is
a conservative organization that is kn.awn to be skeptical of the detente
policy with the Soviet Union and is highly critieal of Secretary Kissinger's
policies in general.

The report was released to the American Security

Council in October of 19751 and the major responsibility for its release
appears to be with both Lieutenant General Daniel

o.

Graham, the Director

of the DIA, and fo:nner Secretary of Defense Schlesinger.
1) Joseph Kra.f't, "The Crumbling Administration•, The Washington
Post, November 4, 19751 P• 14
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The report was worded in a manner that would cause either President
Ford or Secretary of State Kissinger to wonder if the Pentagon was in
the process of undermining the foreign policy objectives of the entire
Administration.

The major thrust of the DIA report is well established

by the statement in it that,
"For the Soviets, detente is intended to facilitate their
attainment of overalJ. ·. d<l!linance of the West •• • in the U.S.
detente tends to be seen as an end in itself, in the u.s.s.R
it is seen as a strategy for achiev.ing broader Soviet objectives as well as tactical aims without fueling the sorts 9f ·
concerns that might galvanize the West into serious counteraction.a
"Soviet long term strategic objectives, 'Which the detente
strategy seeks to promote include: •• •• the establishment of
Soviet political., military, technological and economic superiority worldwide. Soviet detente strategy has facili ta.ted
Soviet strategic eJCPansion and the cancelling out of u.s.
superiori~y without provoking erlensive Western counter
efforts."
The DIA report continued to question the motivation of the Soviets
in pursuing strategic arms limitation agreements, and specifically

stated that the policy of detente had served Soviet purposes well and
that because of that, the Soviets would not discard it but try to use
it to gain other advantages over the United states.

The DIA repOrt

speci.fica1ly said that,
. 1) The long range goal of the Soviets was to break up the Westem

. :· ..,:·. :Alliance and force a

u.s.

military wi thd.rawa.1 :f'loa!l Europe 1

2) "Detente in Soviet Strategy", an Estimate by the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, September 2, 1975,
reprinted in the Washington Report (October 197.5) P• l of the
American Security Council
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2) Detente has encouraged .further Soviet nuclear arms expansion,
3) Soviet nuclear expansion has forced the United States to try to
accC111odate the Soviet Union through concessions at the strategic
arms limitation negotiations,

4) The end result of these developnents has been to neutra1ize the
technological advantage of the United states,
.5) The Soviet Union is trying to isol.a.te Communist China until new

leadership cmies to power after the death of Mao,

6) The Soviet Union is still prepared to exploit any crisis that might
arise in any area of the globe,

7) The Soviets will eventually discard detente if they can gain more
by other means.3
The DIA report went even further in its criticism of American
negotiating strategy. in saying that,
"In strategic weaponry, Soviet detente policy bas created
a climate that has facilitated SALT agreements under which
the u.s. Wa.s prepared to freeze force levels but a.llmr!:the
Soviets to build mmierical parity. •." 4
The American policy, according to the report, along 1d. th Soviet
strategic nuclear expansion, allowed the Soviets to achieve· a force
structure that neutralized America's qualitative superiority•

The

effect that the report had on the state Department and Secretary
Kissinger in particular was to create doubts in their minds as to
3) "Detente Study Feu1ed Kissinger-Sch1esinger Feud11 1
Aviation Week and Space Technolog;r, November 10, 1975,

P• lJ
4) ibid., P• 13
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whether the Pentagon wou1d support
Soviets on SALT

n.

a:rrr

.future negotiations with the

S\teh divisiveness cou1d only hurt the prospects

for a new arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union.

President

Ford was faced with a decision that cou1d trigger enormowLbostillw
towards his administration no matter what his decision was.

The Ford Administration was divided against intself on national.
security,issu.es

-'Of ~.'the : highest

importance.

Differences of opinion

that were long in the making came to a crossroads in which an evaluation
of the strengths and weaknesses in continuing this arrangement had to
be taken into consideration.

With the State Department being accused

of not giving the Pentagon all the information that it requested on
the substance of the Sinai negotiations, and the Secretary of state
having previously not consulted 1l:ith the Pentagon on the assurances
that the

u.s.

gave Israel that it would consider giving them Pershing

missiles 1 the groundwork had already been l.aid for a relationship
that coul.d become increasingly tense and hostile.5 Tensions were made
worse by the continued domination by Secretary Kissinger of the means
of access to the President on issues of national security by virtue of
being NSC advisor to the President.

With the substantive differences

of opinion between both Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Sch1esinger
over SALT, the cruise missile, the backfire bomber and Ml:RV•s, it is
little wonder that Schlesinger and the Pentagon wolild come to the point
where they appear to be openly forcing a decision on the part of the
5) ·Bernard Guertzman, ''Behind Shift: Pnsh for Arms Pact",
The New York Tim.es, November 41 19751 P• 1
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President on ·tbe future of .American national security policy. With t.he
release of the DIA report in October of 1.9151 what can be seen is that
the Administration was divided, and .that the state and Defense Depart..
ments were openly hostile to one another.
President Ford could not tolerate this situation much lcmger.

To

fire Schlesinger wau1d lose him the political support of conservative

'Republicans and Democrats and would .fuel the anti-detente lobby with
more evidence of the fact that Kissinger was too powerful. in the
Administration.

Liberals woul.d express the fear that Kissinger was

without an opponent of his own stature in the Administration, who while
not in agreement; with ·their own phil.osophies 1 could at least provide
a check to Kissinger's influence.

To remove Kissinger would undennine

Ford's foreign policy in the eyes of the rest of the world, and would
.

.

cause the Soviets to wonder if' the United states was about to revert
back to the policies of the Cold War.

The Soviet perception of

Schlesinger as a hard liner and an advocate of "counterforce" nuclear
strategies that couJ.d ·upset the status of detente should not be
discounted. as

a possible reason

for the Schlesinger removal.

The

Soviet fear that detente was losing support among the American· people
was a major reason for the inability of the United States and the
Soviets to reach an agreement on SALT II.

The Schlesinger removal.

could have made this easier from this perspective.

The .·irony is in

that the Sch1esinger removal increased. the detente debate within the
United States and forced the President to reconsider his position on
SALT II, fearing that concessions made by the United States would
further damage his foreign and defense

poli~ies

in an election yea:r.
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Secretary of Defense Schlesinger worsened his al.ready tenuous
position in the Administration when he

outspok~

criticized the Congress

and the Administration for cuts in the defense budget.

This

was~

the

primary reason for the removal of Sch1esinger1 ba.t it did provide the

Administration with an excuse to remove Scbl.esinger and downplay the
importance of the differences between Schl.esinger and Kissing_
e r on SA.LT

and detente.

The defense budget issue is important in that Secretary

Kissinger also wanted to keep defense spending at as econanical le"nll as
possible because he feared that increase in armaments and militar,.
spending 110uld

c~ at the expense of detente.6

Secretary Schlesinger's actions continued to be a source or
discomfort for the Administrati.on and President Ford.

On October 20th

the Secretary held a news conference that criticized the House Appropriations Canm:ittee for making cuts in the defense budget that were described
by the Secretary as "deep, savage and arbitrary". 7

The cuts would have

amounted to $7.6 billion fran the -proposed $97.6 billion budget requested

a

b7 the Administ.ration. 6 Schlesinger himself' wanted . $13. 7 billion
increase in defense sperxling for Fiscal Year 1976.9 President Ford, u
6) Joseph Franm, "Kissinger-Schlesinger Feud•·,
World Report, July 22 1 l.9741 P• 22

u. Se News and

7) John McNaughton, 11The Ford Upheaval. and Some Explanations",
The New York Times, November 6 1 191.$1 P• lh
6) uFord 1 s Cost~ Purge", ~I November 17 1 1975, P• 17

9) 'nle Congressional. Quarterly, November 81 1975, P• 2349
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a minorit7 President llbo was not elected, could i l l afford poor rela.t~ons

with 1egisl.ati'Ye branch that would have been heightened i f

Schlesinger had continued his attacks.

Schl.esinger•s concern over

Soviet increases in its defense budget and military manpower have been
previously refered. to. (See Chapter IlI PP• 22-2.3).
Secretary Schlesinger was also bighl,y critical of the Administra.tion•s proposal to cut the defense budget for Fiscal. Year 1977.

The

Office of !fanagEID.ent and Bwiget had proposed. an $8 billion C1It in the
Defense Department's budget for FY 1977.16 President Ford's desire to
keep the total budget down was obvious'.q a major factor in the OYB
proposal.

Secretary of State Kissinger had always believed th.at

u.s.

defense polic;y should be made mindfttl. of the effects that increased
budgets would have on the condo.ct of foreign pol.ic7 and the impression
it would give to the Sovi.et Union.

Because Sch1esinger

iras . .advocating

an· increase in the defense budget, and it has already" been demonstrated
that the great majority of

u.s.

defense spending accounts for militar"J"

pay canpensation and pensions, the increase1r that Sehl.esinger Was
requesting coul.d only come in the area of strategic weaponey and conventional weapanr,r.

Kissinger was uneasy w1. th Schlesinger's statE1Dents about

the need to increase military" spending in order to match that of the
Soviets because he believed that this 110uld hurt his e.f'fort.s to reach a
·· second arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. 11 1.'he issue of the
10}· The Congressional Qu:a.rt.er'.q1 November 81 1975, P• 2349
11) ibid. P• 23h9
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defense budget. was not

~

and the President,

also one that had ramifications that concemed

the Secretary

l:a1;

er state.

an area o! disagreanent between Schlesinger

SALT and the cmnparative Soviet-American stra-

tegic arms balance were once again at the center o! the issue.
Sch1esinger himself is reported to have said that a second SALT
agrement coul.d have been negotiated b7 Kissinger during June o:f 1974..

12

Kissinger was blamed by some technical eJtPE!l"ts for ordering Secretary
Schlesinger not to subnit position papers written by the· Joint Chiefs of

sta.tt

in Connection with the July 1974 Slllllllit fer then President Nixon's

c~nsideration.13

Both the JCS and Schlesinger wanted to press the

Soviets for more concessions on. nucl.ear missiles than Kissinger believed
was negotiabl.e at the

time.

The issue of defense budgeting on

8.1'7'18

negotiations was undmmtedly another example of how Kissl.nger and
Schlesinger di.f'fered on arms negotiating strategy with the Soviet Union.
Was Schlesinger forcing the issue before the consideration of
the President? .H is dissent from the Administration's policies were onl7

pa.rt of the reason why an iitevitab1e Kissinger-Schlesinger feud came
about.

His inabilit7 to judge the political oonsequenc·e s of national

securit,. decisions and his own concern. with the substance of the iSB11e
.fits his

own non-rationa.1 model. of decision -.king that

is mere concerned

obtaining the best alternative in policy decision :maldng rather than the
12) Leslie H. Ge1b1 "Schlesinger for Defenses Defense for Detente•.
The New York Times :Magazine• Augast la, 1974, P• h3

.13) R. Hotz, "The Case Against Iissinger•, Aviation Week and
~ee Technology• DeeEmber 8• 1975• P• lli
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most accepta.b1e one tor all parties concerned.

A serious dispute was to emerge between the state Dopariment. and
the White House on the one hand and the Pentagon and Secreta.17 Schl.esinger

on the other in the last ·da:rs before Sch1esinget"•s remova:L as Defense
SecretB.17.

The White HollSe accused Schlesinger of having leaked to the

press the disagreements that he bad with Secretar;r

over troop

dep~~ents

in Europe.lh

evidence to back this charge.

or

state Kissinger

there was no substantiating

In the Pentagon, aides

:to

Secretary

SChlesinger were afraid that the White Hou.se and the state Department
were trying to weaken Dr. Schlesinger's role as a counter to Kissinger

on· national security affairs.

The Schlesinger aides saw the remowl. or

Dr. Schlesinger as the resu1t or a •state Department campaign aimed at
weakening Schlesinger• s position•·. 1 5 The antagonisms that were noticeab1e between the tllO Secretaries over SALT II, Soviet violations
of the SAL'l' I and ABM agreements and the defense budget caused Kissinger

to come to see Schlesinger as a ri"f'al. who would threaten his policies
and negotiating strategies, which was a complete change from Kissinger's
perception of Schlesinger in

197h.i. l.6 Whether Schlesinger actua.lly" was a

threat to the success of a SALT II agrement will neTer be known, but his

14) Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, •Into1~1e Dissent•·, The
Wal!!lhington Post, November 6, 1915, P• 2.7

15) Drew 18.dcll.eton, •Schlesinger's Views of Kissinger Described.n,
The New York T:illles, November 81 1975, P• 2
16) •Schlesi.nge1"' on Defensen, Aviatlori Week and Space Technology,
October 21, 1974, P• 9

renoval. onl;r served to force the Soviets to rethink the wiadaa or nego_tiating with a United States that was

interna~

divided over the wisdom

of detente.

The decision

Clll

the part or the President to ask f'or Secretar.r

Schlesinger's resignation came suddenly' and without warning.

Part

or

the reason for this is because the vast majorit:r of the public and even
the Congress, intellectual establishment and the media was not aware

or

the internal di.vision within the Administration that is "typified b7 the
DIA report.

President Ford's statement that

11nei

ther policy nor personal

dirf'erences 11 ' were involved in the Kissinge?1-Scb1esinger f'eud cannot be
taken seriously.

'lbe President was f'aced with an embarrassing situation
.·..

that gotten out or control, and was attempting to deny his past mistakes
by refusing to admit that the substantive poli07 differences between

Kissinger and Schlesinger had divided his Administration.

Eventually the

President was forced to admit that there was an antagonism that existed
between Kissinger and Sch1esinger, but b;r that time' his credibility had
been bad:cy' damaged.17.

The policy confrontation that evolved in the Ford Administration
between Secretar;r or state Henr;y Kissinger and Secretary- or Defense

.

.

James Schlesinger was one that was made inevitable because or their

_differing theoretical conceptions of the international system, the
nature or power in the nuclear age and the importance or detente as a
stabilizing factor in the relations between the United States and the

Soviet Union.

The seriCJllsness of the poliey confrontation was felt

17) •Ford Finally Admits Tension Led to Shake Up•,
The New York Times, November 16, 197.S, Part IY, P• 2
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throughout the Ford Administration.18
The differences o:r opinion on substantive issues between Kissinger

and Schlesinger can be t.raeed t.o their concept.ions of panr and t.he
decision making process in national security affairs.

Kissinger's

rational model or decision making pl.aces greater emphasis no negotiation
or di f:ferenees, the complexity or mill tary power and t.he importance o:t
macropolities.

Kissinger's conception of "1egitimaten' and "revolutionary"

international systems best explains his belief that the Soviets are now
status quo oriented powers, coneemed with preserving the gains that
they already have made.

His concern for the reduction of tensions, a

reduetian or the development of new weapons technologies, and fOr international cooperation gives him a di:fl'erent definition or what is the
nationa1 security than does Dr. Schlesinger.
Schlesinger's faith in deterrence and the need for a preservation
of the military equilibriUlll between the United States and the Soviet
Union Bhows a different motivation than that or Dr. Kissinger.

For

Scb1esinger, det.ente is made possible because o:f 1tan lmderlying
equilibrium of force•.19

The Soviet desire for a reduction in tensions

does not pay as great a role in his developaent of a ratimale as to why"
"detente" is the present state

or

relations between the two superpowers.

The disagreements between Kissinger and Schlesinger over detente
is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that Schlesinger himself

19) James R. Schlesinger, "Weakness Invites Conflict11=
•
Vital Speeches or the Day, October 15, 1975, P• 2
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nmilled highly skeptica1 aver Savi.et motivations .for pursuing d.etente.
Far 1h:m becoming a status quo oriented pOlf'er, the Sorlets, in Sch1e-

silll:' e view, <b not wish to posi;pone national liberation movements
andllllr8 of liberation, but instead wish to increase the ideologica1

stngle between the superpowers.

Sch1esinger states that,

•rn

the Soviet view, detent.e itself is the consequence of
the outgrowth of Soviet power, which bas f"orced the West
to grant concessions.... Far :f'ran sharing the Westem
Tiew of detente as gradual reconciliation, w.i th the hope
of ending the possibility o:f conflict, the Soviets view
detente as rich w.i. th opportunities f"or major gains-in
short, as confrontation in another guise". 20
With two opposing phi1osophies such as these it should be

reill!rated that the t110 Secretaries did not disagree on whether
daiim.te exists,

but over the meaning of it.

I:f detente means that

the iidted. states can reduce its commitments around the world and
drallnically reduce its defense budget, then the definition of the

natima.l security has a1so been dram.atioal]3' changed.
.A:med:an President ever justify sending

u. s.

Hem. will an

troops into combat in

an tft'ort; to "cOntain" Commnnism. 1 as in Korea and Vietnam, if the
SavJdB are now a status quo power? Do potential liberation movements
in .ft.i:.ca and South America have no importance to the U.S. national

secmi\y? Above all, does detente mean that the United States can

witVl'aw into a period of neo-isol..ationism, being totall.y concerned
witbits own domestic problems, while neglecting the problems that face

the.arld at the international level?

The answers to these questions,

20) James R. Schlesinger, •A Testing Time Fer America",
Fort.mie, Februal'1' 19761 P• 147
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and t<> the

rea~ons

for 'the Kissingel\-Schl.esinger controversy in 'the Ford

Adninistration must lie in an analysis of the nature of the international

S1'Stem1 the ability of nations to use power to influence or deter other
nations f'r<n exhibiting certain kinds o! behavior and in the process by
which national secu.rity decision ma.leers develop policies that shoul.d be
:followed if peace is to be preserved.

Cbapt.er VIII

KISSINGER AND SCHIESOOER: FOREIGN AND AMERICAN REACTION

The interest with which the naticns around the wor1d viewed the
Kissinger-SChlesinger controversy shou.ld not be over1ooked.

For it

establishes the int.ensit7 of the two Communist giants reactions to the
controversy and also the doubts that our NATO and West European allies
had as to the strength

or

the American commitment to their defense.

It

shows once again that the perceptions of nations as to the foreign and
defense policies of the United States is in large measure influenced by
the individuals who man the decl sion making positions in nationa1 securit.y affairs.

Policy al.one is not saffi.cient.

Policy differel)ces, as

we ha.Te seen, can be so intense that .foreign nations will be confused

.

as to Wiat American policy actually is.
of nations

'!he reactions and perceptions

to the Kissinger-.Scblesinger controTersy rlll S1ow that. this

incident was of great interest t.o the international. conummity, specificcally, the Soviet Union.

Soviet Reaction
The Soviet Union was delighted with the removal of Secretary
Schlesinger from his position, as could be expected frce the fears
about him that were voiced in the past.

The Soviets corroborate the

findings of the author that the disagreements between Secretary Kissinger
and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger had been centered on detente and
the strategic arms limitation negotiating strategy; of the United states
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with the Soviet Union. 1 The Soviets are also to have reported that the
Atlantic Ccmmwrl.ty and supporters of NATO would "miss the politician who
tirelessly warned of the Soviet threat•.2

In the eyes of the Soviets,

the dismissal of Secreta.r;r Schlesinger was seen as

a victory .for detente

and the policies of the Ford-Kissinger Administration.
The Soviets had been following the Kissinger-Schlesinger feud
close]Jr for more than one year.3

'lhe Soviets regarded a victory by

Kissinger as essential if the detente relationship between the United
States and the Soviet Union was to cmtinue.

The great majority of the

study that was done by the Soviets on the Kissinger-Sehl.a singer feud
was done by specialists at the Kremlin think-tank, the USA Institute
for International Relations and World Economics.4 The Institute
followed the differences on policy between Kissinger and Schlesinger
for over a year,. and came to the conclusion that Kissinger's approach
to bargaining 111. th the Soviet Union was endangered by the presence o.f
Schlesinger in the Administration.

They

na~uralJ.y

warmly endorsed the

move by President Ford to dismiss Schlesinger.
The Soviet news agency TASS' reported that the editor

ar

the Soviet

magazine USA-EconCJllics, Politics, Ideology, Valentin Berezhkov, welcomed
1) "Shake Up in Washington•, Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
November 26 1 1975, P• 23
2) Current Digest of the Soviet Press, December 101 1975, P• 21
3) Peter Osnos, "KrBnlin Saw Defense Chief as Foe"·,

The Washington Post, November

4, 1975,

P• 1

4) "Personnel Changes Cause Strong Repercussions", Peking Review,
November 141 1975, P• 20
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tbe Schlesinger dismissal in ca11ing it tta positive developnent between

the superpawers 11·.S One could conclude that the harsh Soviet criticism
of the Schlesinger retargeting policies, calls for increases in the
defense budget, and hard line approach to strategic anns limitation
negotiations with Soviets were the primary reasons for their approval
of Ford's decision to replace Schlesinger.
-...&

Whether Schlesinger actually'

an impediment to an improvement in Soviet-American relations is

debatable, but the Soviet reaction to his removal does demonstrate the
importance of the Kissinger-Soble singer incident and the diligence with
which the Soviets studied the individual di:f.f'erences between the two
Secretaries.
Canmun:i.$t China's Reaction
The Communist Chinese were dismayed by the firing of Secretary
Schlesinger, fearing that the United States had succmnbed to the
pressures for easy concessions to the Soviet Union in future anns
limitation agreements negotiations.

Quotes fl-om the Chinese interna-

tional news digest Peking Review of foreign reactions to the firing
are entirely negative.

Peking Review stated that the West Germans

were "stunned"' by the firing, that the loss of Schlesinger would be
detrimental to the NATO alliance and that the French paper France Soir
stated that Schlesinger "was sacrificed on the altar of detenten. 6 The
Communist Chinese were concerned that the detente relationship between

5) ibid. I P• 19
6) ibid., P• 20
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the thited states and the Soviet Union was being carried too far, and
that they woul.d eventually becme the victims of the relationship.

An

~is

of the Soviet and Chinese reactions to the Kissinger-

Sool.esinger incident shows that the two Camnunist giant~ still hold a
great deal of animosity towards one another.

The Chinese are fearful

that the "American connection" that bad been established by President
Nixon was beginning to weaken.

The Chinese response to the Schlesinger

firing was one that was wary of Soviet motivations for pursuing detente,
and they saw Schlesinger as a possibl.e ally in this regard.

The Soviets

..

sided with Kissinger in the controversy1 and had nothing but negative
remarks for Secretary Schlesinger.
West German Reaction
The West Gennans had favored Secretary Schlesinger's policies on
the need not to sacrifice defense spending and preparedness for the sake
of detente.7

In particul.ar, West Gennan Defense Minister Georg Leber was

an ardent Schlesinger admirer.

The West Gennans analyzed the incident

in much the same way as did the Soviets and the Chinese.

Schlesinger

appeared to be an obstacle to a successful completion of the SALT II
agreement, but West Gennan opinion was divided as to whether the United
States would profit from a Kissinger diplomatic victory with the Soviets
at SALT II. 8

One West Gennan analyst commented on the fact that

Kissinger

7) Bernard Weintraub, "Nato Reported to Feel it is.

Ally", The New York Times, November
8) Atlas, December 1975, P• 6

4, 1975,

LJ?aing

P• 25
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nUnllke Schlesinger, is prepared to bring in the technological
advantage o:f the cruise missile~ the guided missile that can
strike at military targets by ducking under radar screens to
the nuclear exchange dealn·. ~
Defense Minister Leber•s good relationship with Schlesinger was
undoubtedly a reason for his sorrow at Schlesinger• s dismissal..

It

should be .remembered that Schlesinger and Leber worked out an agreement
during the weeks after the 1973 October War that provided that U.S.
military equipnent would not be sent fran West Germany to Israel on
Israeli ships.

Kissinger's poor relations with the Europeans at that

t:iJne most probably was remembered by the West Germans as they considered
the impact of the Schlesinger removal.
Great Britain, France and ItaJ.,z
· Other European reaction to the removal of Dr. Schlesinger showed
a coneern over the strength that Secretary of State Kissinger would now
have in the making of American national security policy in the Ford
Administration.

From Great Britain, it was commented on that Secretary-

Kissinger would now have a free hand in the making of anns limitation
agreements with the Soviet Union. 10 Even when Dr. Schlesinger was
admonished for his defense policies and desire to increase the technological capabilities of America's nuclear forces, he was praised in that
he provided Kissinger with a countercheck to make sure that the ·_aprice of
9) "Ford Shows Strength in Halloween Yassacre" 1 '!he German Tribune,
November 16, 19751 P• 3
10) The London Tines, November

5,

1975, P• 15
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detente was not too high".ll

The Icndon Times cited Secretary Schlesinger's desire to deve1op
the cruise missile and the B-1 bmnber as reasons why he was considered
an obstacle by the Soviets to another attempt t.o conclude the SALT II
accords.12 Kissinger's wide acceptance on the part of the international
carummity was seen as important in the decision to remove Schlesinger,
because of the fact that the removal of Kissinger wOlll.d have jeopardized
the stability of .American foreign poll cy at a ti.me when stability was
absolutely necessary.
The Italians and the French both expressed the belief that
Schlesinger's removal would ease the way for Secretary Kissinger to
negotiate a compromise at the SALT talks. 13

'!heir insight into the

the origins of the Kissinger-Sch1esinger feud suggests that all West
:European

nation~

not merely the West Germans am the British., were

cognizant of the differences between the Secretary of st.ate 8J1d the
Secretary- of Defense that divided the Administration on national
security matters • . '11te reacticn of the European nations shows that
there was a concern over the future of American policy., and that;tbe

removal of Schlesinger apparently removed any doubts in their mind as
to what policies t.he United States would foll.ow.
was still the subject

or

Kissinger, however,

cri tid.l!lll, and the Europeans feared that his

influence could become too strong.

11) ibid., p. 15
12) The Icndon Times, November

13) At1as, December 1975, P• 6

4, 1975, P• 5
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Japanese Reaction
The Japanese reaction to the removal of Secretary Schlesinger was

mixed.

The Japanese were more inclined t.o see politics as the motivation

for the Schlesinger removal, but they did express concern that the United
States was weakening its canmitments in the Far Ea.st.

Secretar,r Schle-

singer had been an important participant in the promotion of US-Japanese
relations and mutual understanding.lb.

Schlesinger's reiteration of the ·

American defense commi. tment t.o South Korea was probably a major factor
in the Japanese express.i on of concern.

While the Japanese tended to

discount the belief that ' Schlesinger's removal was

a victory for Secre"'"

tary Kissinger, they did state that "there will be a need :for reassurances in this part of the world11 that the United States would retain a

strong defense posture af'ter the removal of Sch1esinger. 1S Whether t.he
Japanese were fearful. that the United states would abrogate its responsibilities to the Japanese was not clear, but the Japanese did remind
.the .Americans that the United States-Japanese Security Treaty was still"

a basic U.S. policy". 16
The Middle Ea.st
The impact that the removal. of Secretary of Defense Sch1esinger
had on Israel and Egypt was different, as one could expect.

The

Israelis, in spite of the delays that they experienced with the United
lls.) Atlas, December 1975, P• 6

15) The Japan Times, November 6, 1975, P• 12
16) Atlas, December 1975, P• 6

States over the resuppJ.7 ·crisis in the October War of 1973, were
concerned that the rEllloval of Schlesinger would make it harder for

than to get weapons from the United States.

'!he Tel Aviv paper

Yedioth .Ahronoth was particularly concerned over the i.m.pa.ct that the
Schlesinger removal would have cm future weapons premrements .f'rtln
the United states.17

If Schl.esinger was responsible for the resuppJ.7

delays as was suggested, it is cert.a.inly ironic that the Israelis
would be concemed about the effect of his rE!lloval. as Defense Secretary

would have on their ability to obtain arms from the United St.ates.
The Egyptians, aware of Schlesinger's criticism of the Soviet

Union during the 1973 October War and his cooperation with Kissinger
in the implementation of the worl.drlde alert o:f

different reaction to his dismissal.

u.s.

forces, had a

The Egyptians were report.ed to

be delighted with bis ramovai.18
The Reaction of NATO
The reaction of NATO to the Schlesinger firing was greatest among
a1l organizations concerned with .American cooperation with defense

partners.

Schlesinger had always been bigh]J' regarded at NATO and by

European defense officials for favoring a strong Atlantic Alliance
and defense preparedness for Europe.

His opposition to the unilateral

w.i thdrawal of American troops from the European continent was a primar,r

17) llichae1 Getler, 11Defense Shift is a Jolt to Bonn, NAT011 1
The Washington Post, November 3 1 197.5, P• lli

18) The London Times, November 4, 1975, P• .5
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reason for their admiration of the Defense Secretary.

Schlesinger had

the trust of the NATO officials because of his authoritative command of
the subject of military strategy, his ability to make quick decisions
and his ability to give the NATO defense ministers the philosophica1
arguments to reinvigorate the NATO communi.ty.19 NATO official.s were
especially concerned that the new
~sfeld, was a

u.s.

Defense Secretary, Donald

novice in the area of defense affairs and did not have

Schlesinger's expertise. 20
The NATO concern was one of how strong the .American defense
canmitment towards thElll would be after the remova1 of Secretary
Schlesinger.

The Western Europeans and the NATO officials, as might

be expected, were concerned that Kissinger would cane to dominate the
making of American defense policies towards Europe and NATO now that

Schlesinger was out of the picture.

The cordiality with which American-

NATO relations had been conducted during the tenure of

Dr. Schlesinger

as Defense Secretary were now subjected to new inputs that made
European of:f'icials 110nder as to the strength of the American commitment

to their defense.
An Ana.qsis of Foreign Reaction

An analysis of the foreign reaction to the Kissinger-Schlesinger

incident shows that the foreign nations had a good grasp of the
19) Benw;u··Jl'eintraub, "NATO Reported. to Feel it is losing strong
~", The Hew York Times, November 4, 1975, P• 2S
20) ibid•• P•

25
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substantive issues that were the cause of the incidmt,, but that they

did not have a clear wight as to how

rar t.he

Ferd AchiDistrat,ion bad

been divided aga.:lllst itself over detente and the intensity of the
mistrust that was alluded to in the release of the DIA report to the
American Security Cotincil and the accusations by both the state and
Defense Departments about the attempts by the other department to
undennine their Secretary's inf'.lnence w.i.th the President was not
mentioned, perhaps because of' the f'act that these accu.sations were not
made public 'Wltil after the removal of Secreta.r,r Schlesinger.
The Soviets, in particular, had a keen insight as to the theoretical
and substantive differences that separated Kissinger and Schlesinger.
The Soviets had been studying these differences for over a ;rear, and
concluded that the rem.oval or Secretary Schlesinger would be in their own
interests.

But the reaction to the Schlesinger firing in the United

States set of! a debate over detent.e policy with the Soviet Union that
entered into the Presidential primary campaign and u1timate:cy- led to a
postponement of the SALT II agreement.

The Soviets decided to await the

outeme of the debate within the United states and would not accept the
compromise proposals offered by Secretary of state Kissinger.

The

firing of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger did little to make the
conclusion or the SALT II agreement with the Soviets any easier.
The American Reaction
The dismissal or Secretary Schlesinger created a stom or protest
from both the political right and left in this CO'ID'ltry.

The right
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regarded t.he firing as a mistake because they feared that. Kissinger was
neglecting the changes made in the international balance of power dne t.o
increases in Soviet strategic and military weaponry-.

The political left

that Kissinger wou1d become even more powerful. and tend to embark on even
more JIOlo.' l)etfo:r.aiailces in the conduct of .American foreign policy, at the
neglect of the powers of the Congress.

The President was subjected to

vast amounts of criticism in his handling of the Kissinger-Schlesinger
feud that left sCJne observers wondering as to the effectiveness of his
leadership. 21

The study of the substantive differences and

~osity

between Kissinger and Seb1esinger should show, however, that the
President could no longer tolerate this situation and made the correct
decision.
, Both llbe~a1s and con~ervatives, doves and ha*s, While disagree-.
.
.
ing on Schlesinge.r' s basic _assumptions about American national security

polley-1 did agree that the Schlesinger removal marked a victory for
Secretary of St.ate Kissinger.

In spite of Kissinger's remo'V!ll as

National Security Advisor to· the President, it was a~e4 that the
Schlesinger firing placed Kissinger in a role in which he would be

ev~n In.ore dominant in th~ dir~ction of American fo~ign policy.

Conserv-

atives feared that the President wou1d be kept insulated from the counter
arguments t.hat SChlesinger .had raised.22

Liberals feared a Kissinger

hegemony over foreign policy and expressed the doubt t.hat t.he Soviets
21) 'l'he Washington Post, November

51 1975, P• 26

22) George F. Will, "Capit.al. Issues", National Review,
November 211 1975, P• 1287
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and the United. States would now reach a SALT II agreemant. 23
The Ford Administration was severly criticized on Capital Hill for
the Schlesinger firing.

Democratic Senator Henry M. Jackson o! Washington

expressed the opinion that the Ford decision showed that the President
•coul.d not tolerate differences or opinion".24 Congressional opponents
of Kissinger were relieved that be was no 1onger National Security

Council Advisor to the President1 25 but many Congressmen thought that it
was Kissinger, and not Schlesinger, who was the man that should have been
removed.26 Congressional Republicans were worried that the Schlesinger
firing would hurt the President politically, especially with the conserv-

ative wing of the party that was anxious to follow the lead of fonner
California Governor Ronald Reagan and take the Republican Presidential
nC111ination away .trcm the inc1J1I1bent President. 27
The Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy had digressed far beyond
the point of mere 0 differences of opinion".

The · fact that each Secreta.17

had a dii'ferent perception of detente and the means to preserve it bad
led to a schism in the Ford Administration that had become so intense
that antagonisms between the state and Defense Departments came out into
the open and hurt. the cohesiTeness of the administration's national
23) Tad Szu1c, 11 The Firings and Foreign Policy",
The New Republic, November 15, 1975, P• 8

24) George lerdner, Jr., 11 Ford Fires Schlesinger, Colby",
The Washington Post, November J, 1975, P• l

25) The Oregon Journal, November 3, 1975, P• 7
26) The London Times, November

4, 1975,

P• 5

27) Rowland EVans and lbbert Novak, ''Miscalculating at the White
House•, The Washington Post, November 5, 1975, P• 26

10].

security policy.

Accusations by the State Depa.rlment that the rel.ease

of the DIA report to the .American Security CO\D'lcil endangered detente is
not scmething that is charged because of a President's anibitions.

The

accusations by the Pentagon that Secret.ary Sch1esinger•s remova1 was the
end resul.t ef a state Department campaign to weaken Schl.esinger 1 s infiuence is not something that can be attributed to election year politics,
the incompetency of the President or the fact that Kissinger hel.d down
two jobs.

The system of compromise and concensus building had canpletely

broken down.
Policy differences generated out of two entirely different viewpoints on detente and America 1 s national security requirements were the
principal reasons for the Kissingel'-Schlesinger schisn.

The friction

that evolved between Kissinger and Schl.esinger over detente and American
negotiating strategy gave President Ford no other alternative but to put
an end to the struggle as soon as possible and suffer the polltica1
consequences of the decision.

To do otherwise would have aggravated

the division within his administration and perhaps have led to a serious
policy confrontation in the future when the need for CClllpromise and
bargaining within the Administration would have been imperative.

Chapter II
KISSINGER AND

SCHI.EfilWER~

CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS

The Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy in the Ford Administration
was devel.oped out o.f
o.f

theoretic~

di.:f.ferent conceptions o.f the utility

power as a deterrent in the internationa1 system, the means by which

the United States should cmne to policy decision on matters of national
security, and the very role that the United States shou1d play in the
international system.

These dif.ferences were so strong that a process

of compranise in order to build a concensus on policy was made impossible
in the Ford Administration.

The fact that the decision makl.ng process

in national security affairs is an inherently political. one, with values

and beliefs- playing a major role in the process, should lBad one to the
conclusion that the reason for the split between Kissinger and Schlesinger
had to be because of their value orientations and belief' systems, rather
than any other consideration.

The refusal to canpromise or bargain,

through which a concensus can be denied, was due to individual differences
in theory and philosophy that transcended any other consideration.

Differences on the nature of power, the rational and non-ratioo.al.
approaches to national securi.ty decision ·making and the dispute over
whet.her the Soviet Union viewed detente in the same manner as the West
were found to be the underlying reasons .for the substantive policy disagreements on such issues as SALT negotiating strategy, possible Soviet
violations of pa.st agreements,

u.s.

defense spending and the importance

of the growth of the Soviet military.

The Kissinger model could be de-

scribed as one that inclndes a belief in political multipolarit;y and the

10.3
rationality of .the decision maker.

Kissinger's description of 11 revolu-

tiona.ryn and •legitimate 11 international systems are ones that helped to
con.finn. in his mind the belief that the Soviets are now wi.l.ling to
pursue policies that shaw "an element of restraint".

l

The fact that

the Soviets, in the Kissinger model, bad come to see that they could
benefit from preserving the international system as it

present~

is

influenced his belief that the United States must adopt a foreign policy
that is limited in its objectives and a national security policy that
takes into account the need to preserve the present detente relationship.
Power and deterrence as elements of a

u.s.

national security policy are

considered of less importance to Kissinger than to Dr. Schlesinger.
The Schlesinger model was found to stress a reliance on non-rational
factors in the developnent of a national. security decision making process.
Deterrence, the personality of' the decision maker and the importance or
technological developnents are a11 considered to be primary factors that
should be considered in the determination of a national security policy.
The assumed rationality of the decision maker and his need to seek peace
was not as import.ant as the perception of one's strength by other nations.
Power was not considered in te:nns of its utility, but in term.a of its
deterrent ef'fect.

Schlesinger would agree that although it is of no

utility for the United states and the Soviet Union to use nuclear weapons,
it does not therefore mean that it is of no utility to have thElll.

This

is perhaps best demonstrated in Schlesinger's statement that detente is
1) James E. Doman and Peter c. Hughes, "Power and Purpose in
American Foreign Polic;r', Modern Age, Spring 1975, P• 173
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not gained independently of a general mill tary and strategic equ:µibrium.
The fact that detente rests on an equilibrium of force, according to
Schlesinger,

is an "underlying requirement for the preservation of

intemational. political stability", and it is therefore important that
the United States continue to maintain its commitments and strengthen
its defenses in spite of detente.2
The need to redefine the national security policy of the United
States in an era of detente is the most important aspect in an ana.J.J'sis
of the meaning of the Kissingel'o-Schlesinger dispute.

Do deterrence and

balance of power theories still matter in the age of detente? Does an
increase in our capability to respond to potential. nuclear threats enhance deterrence?

Or does it increase the risk of nuclear

war?

While Dr. Schlesinger believed that the balance of power and
deterrence were requirements for the maintenance of inte:niational
political stability, Dr. Kissinger does not share that belief.
Kissinger has stated that,
"The shape of the future will ultimately depend on the
convictions that far transcend the physical balance of power". 3
Kissinger• s approach is perhaps best described as one in which the
Secretary wishes to present fewer OpPortunities to the superpowers and
over nations for the use of nuclear weapons.
almost

a1wa.~

Because nuclear warfare is

irrational, deterrence would be enhanced i f fewer

2) James R. Schlesinger, "Weakness Invites Conflict",
Vital Speeches of the Day~ October 15, 1975, P• 2
3) Hwy A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policz,

New York, 1974) P• 80

(w. w.

Norton & co.a
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opportunites were avail.able in whch a decision maker might attempt a
nuclear war in hopes or gaining a temporary advantage.Ii Kissinger's

writings and efforts as Secretary of state have been directed at trying
to enhance deterrence through providing fewer opportunities for the
utilization of nuclear weapons and through a nuclear policy that tries
to negotiate force levels on the assumption that increases in nuclear
force levels are a destabilizing influence on the strategic anns balance.
The study of international politics ntUst include the study of such
concepts as power, the national security, peace and diplomacy.

Yfuen

differing opinions emerge aver the meaning of these concepts, the problem is one of determining whether what are the political limitations

or

these concepts, and how a decision maker is to decide what is important
and what is not important.

At that moment, the factual evidence cC111es

into play1 and the decision maker must decide, upon the evidence that
is before him, what policy to pursue.

Kissinger and Schlesinger both

observed evidences or changes in the military and strategic balance, ..: .
changes in the can.position of the international system, and changes in
the attitudes of the American public on issues of foreign and national
.

defense poll cy1 and crone to fundamentally difi'erent conclusions as to
how our national security policy shou1d be conducted.
The study of their individual belief systems, decision making models
and perceptions are important in 1.llldersta.nding uhy the substantive policy
differences arose in the Ford Administration.

Ir one was to look

at the substantive differences, he could oonclude

~the

o~

dispute

4) Herbert Scovil.le, Jr., "Flexible Madness", Foreign Policy,
Spring 1974, P• 164
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occurred, but be would have di.fficul.ty concluding !!!lit occured. The
study of the substantive policy dtl'ferences on issues such as SALT II
negotiating strategy• detente with the Soviet Union• the size of the
defense budget and possible Soviet violations of past agreements shaw
that each Secretary disagreed on fundamental concepts in international
polltics such as power and the means by 'Which to cane to national.
security decisions.

Their di.fferences became so intense that the

Defense Department issued a study questioning the whole concept of
detente.
The policy differences can be traced -to the differences that
each Secretary bad of the international system, the role of power and
deterrence, and the place of the decision maker in national security
affairs.

The administrative disharmony in the Ford Admi.nistration was

the result of these differences.

The President was forced to resQlve

the schism throu.gh the removal of one of the two antagonists.
and defense policy

coordin~tian

Foreign

in bis administration would have

continued to deteriorate had he refused to do so.
The Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy in the Ford Administration
has great significance i f .t'uture administrations are to avoid reocCUI'rences or this situation.

The coordination of defense and foreign

policy is imperative in the present era of detente and nuclear parity.
Above all the United States should heed the words or William P. Bundy
when he wrote that the United States
"••• should above all remain cool•• Refinements and continued
research may be needed-- as I understand Secretary Schlesinger

107
is now proposing- but in the last analysis the United States
should refuse to be lured furl.her into an unending arms race." 5
The international system has undergone many changes in the years
since the end of the Second World War.

These changes were to cause

Secretary of state Heney A. Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James R.
Schlesinger to disagree on major issues of national. security policy in
the administration of President Gerald R. Ford.

The theoretical differ-

ences between the two Secretaries were manifested at the substantive
policy level.

This proves the thesis that it was the theoretical and

conceptual differences on the nature of the international system, power
in the nuclear age and the process by which to arrive at national

security decisions in an age of detente that made canprond.se impossible
within the Ford Administration on issues of nationa1 security.

5) William P. Bundy, "International Security Today",
Foreign Affairs, October 1974, P• 28
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